

# THE *Nation*

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## *The Shape of Things*

THE RESCUE OF THE ALTMARK CAPTIVES was an enterprise stamped with the authentic "Nelson touch," which combines audacity with a willingness to wink at the law in emergencies. Determined not to allow the British seamen, who for three months had suffered close confinement in the hold of the German ship, to be carried to Germany, the British Admiralty deliberately gave orders involving the violation of Norwegian neutrality. The complete success which attended the operation makes the Nazis' fury understandable, but so far as international law is concerned their case looks weak. The Altmark appears to have been a warship masquerading as a merchant vessel, and its captain, when asking for Norway's protection while in its territorial waters, failed to disclose the fact he had prisoners aboard. Under these circumstances the British are taking a high line, refusing either to apologize or make reparation and reading Norway a lecture for failing in its duties as a neutral. Authorities on international law in this country support the view that Norway had allowed a breach of it, but this does not automatically excuse the British, who, strictly speaking, ought to have confined themselves to diplomatic action with a view to forcing Norway to detain and examine the Altmark. In war time, however, one violation of the law usually leads to another, and the position of small states which stand between big belligerents is a miserable one, since each side demands that neutrality be so interpreted as to favor its cause. Hitherto the Germans have been readier than the Allies to apply strong-arm methods to the neutrals, and as a result have received more favors. Now, it would appear, the Allies are preparing to redress the balance by becoming equally tough.

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DURING THE PAST WEEK THE RED ARMY IN the Karelian Isthmus has been slowly but relentlessly pressing forward, and while the Mannerheim Line, which is a position fortified in depth, has not yet been broken, it is evident that the situation of its defenders is becoming increasingly grave. Now that it has successes to talk about, Moscow is more communicative, but it is worth noting that it considers it unwise to give the Rus-

sian people any hint about the price in killed and wounded. According to accounts from the Finnish side, the Soviet expenditure in men and munitions is prodigious. Meanwhile the Finnish shortage of man-power is making itself felt. There are few reserves available for a counter-attack if the Russian drive falters, and the difficulty of affording the front-line fighters adequate rest is a constant problem. Among experts there is general agreement that only large reinforcements from other countries can save Finland. Sweden, however, has flatly refused to intervene in a military way, nor will it permit organized bodies of troops to pass through its territories. Thus even if the Allies decided to send regular forces to aid Finland—and it is rumored that they were prepared to dispatch three divisions—the way is blocked. Sweden's reluctance to abandon its position of formal neutrality is understandable enough in view of the constant threat offered by Germany. Only this week ominous movements in the German Baltic ports have been noted, while the Nazi press is openly threatening.

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THE COLDEST WINTER IN NORTHERN EUROPE for a century is adding to the miseries of war. In Finland the weather has undoubtedly been an aid to the defense, but it has intensified the suffering of the evacuees from the cities and those whose homes have been destroyed by Soviet bombers. The Northern neutrals, dependent on Britain and Germany for coal, have found their reduced supplies still further diminished owing to the freezing of the Baltic and its approaches to an extent that has almost halted sea transport. In Copenhagen hot water has become a rare luxury, and in Sweden mobilized reservists have been diverted from drills to wood-cutting. Weather news from Britain is impeded by the censor, who fears it might provide the enemy with valuable information, but it is known that there has been at least one blizzard which dislocated railroad traffic for several days. Germany has suffered still more severely, and its chronic coal shortage has become acute. The German transport system was already strained, since the blockade made it necessary to move by rail and canal goods which formerly went by sea. Ice-blocked waterways and heavy snows have produced almost a breakdown, and Berlin and other large cities are experiencing a coal famine. The result is an epidemic of influenza—a foe better fought with butter than with

guns. But hard as is the lot of Germans, it is paradise compared with that of the Poles and Jews, who are being shifted around the country in cattle trucks or left to face zero weather in shattered homes.

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IN THE MIDST OF ACCENTUATED ECONOMIC warfare throughout the world, representatives from ten countries gathered at The Hague under League auspices two weeks ago to discuss means of post-war economic collaboration. The conference obtained relatively small notice in the press and seems to have achieved little of immediate consequence. Yet it set up machinery which, if properly utilized, may make it possible for the world to avoid many of the economic blunders which characterized the peace following the last war. It is generally recognized that in its own field the economic section of the League has been far more successful than the political section. Given proper support from the United States and other neutrals, this expanded economic body, with facilities for thorough study and unlimited publicity at its disposal, may force statesmen to recognize realities in the post-war settlement.

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SENATOR NORRIS IS RIGHT WHEN HE SAYS that a trustee, particularly in a receivership like that of the Associated Gas and Electric, should be above suspicion. To judge from Arthur Krock's column in the *New York Times* of February 13, Senator Norris concludes that John W. Hanes was picked for trustee by "insiders" before the bankruptcy proceedings were even begun. Some of the worst abuses in the history of corporate receiverships have resulted from just such attempts by management or controlling interest to arrange matters in advance. This may or may not be true in the case of A. G. and E. We impute no unethical conduct to Mr. Hanes. He may well have known nothing of what was going on, but we believe that under the circumstances Federal Judge Leibell would be wise to heed Senator Norris's warning, and name no trustee who can be linked in any way with the present management of A. G. and E. Too many small investors have lost too many millions in that company already, and complaisant federal courts have bred too many scandals in receiverships. Remember Judge Manton.

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THAT DAMNABLE "COMMUNISTIC" DEVICE, the inheritance tax, has finally driven the House of Morgan to take out incorporation papers. According to the *Wall Street Journal*, not an unfriendly source, the decision of J. P. Morgan and Company to add an Inc. and become a state bank with trust powers is the result of the death of Charles Steele, a Morgan partner since 1900

and one of the firm's largest owners. Until now the firm has been a simple partnership. Incorporation, and the issuance of stock to the partners, will make it possible for the Steele estate to meet inheritance taxes without withdrawing more capital from the firm. Last September the Steele estate withdrew \$5,000,000, reducing capital to \$20,000,000. The sum, for so fabulously powerful a banking firm, seems a puny one to a public accustomed to think in terms of New Deal budgets. Perhaps more important than the decision to become a state bank and trust company is the announcement that the Morgans' old Philadelphia affiliate, Drexel and Company, will hand over its deposits to the Morgan bank and become a separate entity engaging in the securities and underwriting business. This will give Morgan and Company two "separate entities" in the marketing of securities, Drexel and Company and Morgan, Stanley.

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MARTIN DIES CAME BACK TO WASHINGTON full of ideas for his spring offensive. He will expose "communism" in Hollywood, he will probe further into consumer organizations—under the distorted guidance of J. B. Matthews—and he will unveil "Communists in the government." There is little that is new in this program; for two years Mr. Dies has been promising to uncover Communists in the New Deal, and he has yet to produce one exhibit. But his announcement assured the country of another lurid instalment in the story of a committee which has become a standing menace to democratic institutions. It is only two months since the Dies committee issued its "moderate" report, winning the acclaim of liberal columnists like Raymond Clapper. Then we were told that Mr. Dies had "reformed" and that his investigation would follow a new pattern; now we know the degree of his reformation. The agenda he outlined continues a tradition: the committee will keep its eyes focused on the left and wink benevolently at the right; it will contribute valiantly to the Republican war chest; and—Mr. Dies promises—it will suspend operations this summer after the damage has been done. We would not, of course, urge the Dies committee to summon Coughlin, for under Dies's stewardship no effective treatment of Coughlin could be anticipated. If a real probe of Coughlin's affairs were made in advance, he could be cross-examined into extinction; but Mr. Dies doesn't do things that way, as earlier hearings have demonstrated. The simple truth is that liberals can expect nothing but disaster from this committee. While liberal pressure can force some improvements in procedure—such as preventing the chairman from talking at so great a rate—it cannot transform Dies. There is only one inquiry worth fighting for now: an investigation into the activities and associations of Martin Dies, as outlined by Representative Hook and *The Nation*.

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WE COMMEND ATTORNEY GENERAL JACKSON for his courage and fairness in ordering the dismissal of the indictment against sixteen persons accused of recruiting soldiers for the Spanish Loyalists. He could see no good, he said, in "reviving in America at this late date the animosities of the Spanish conflict." The fact that Attorney General Murphy ordered these cases presented to the grand jury just before he was elevated to the Supreme Court makes us uneasy about his liberalism. The dismissal of the indictments confirms us in the belief that the budding Palmerism the Administration has been showing in the past few months is not favored by Attorney General Jackson and strengthens our suspicion that the FBI tail has been trying to wag the New Deal dog. To prosecute people for helping to enlist men for the Loyalists while inviting men to volunteer for the Finnish army, whatever the legal distinctions involved, was not to inspire confidence, and we are glad the matter has been dropped. We hope the job will be completed by a return of the papers taken in a raid on the headquarters of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in New York. This action flouted basic constitutional guaranties against arbitrary police action. J. Edgar Hoover and his men seem to think themselves above such trivial matters as constitutional guaranties. A reproof is called for.

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THE RESULTS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE SUBMITTED to the New York police force primarily to determine how many are members of the Christian Front are open to conflicting interpretations; Mayor LaGuardia's statement on the issue is not. He has vigorously seconded Police Commissioner Valentine's contention that membership in the Front and service on the force are incompatible. The immediate question is what measures will be taken to give substance to his words. According to preliminary figures issued by the Mayor's office, 27 policemen admit that they are still enrolled in the Christian Front; 380 others confess to membership in the past. We see no alternative in the case of the twenty-seven to a flat demand for their resignation from the Front or the force. There are already signs that last year's street violence will be renewed in the spring under Coughlinite auspices—which means that policemen identified with the Front have no business patrolling the streets. As for the 407 who disclaim present affiliation, obviously no reprisals are in order. Undoubtedly many of them joined in innocence; certainly there is no immediate way of knowing how many retain a secret sympathy with the terrorist organization. That will be determined by their behavior in the coming months. It would be foolish to believe that the problem will be dissipated overnight, but there is reassurance in the apparent determination of city officials to face the issue before it attains explosive proportions.

UNLIKE THE ROMAN CATHOLIC HIERARCHY we are not in favor of "bringing God back" into economic life. The phrase sounds too much like "pie in the sky." Theology, like politics, has its demagoguery, and the best way to avoid antagonizing either the worker or his boss is to explain from the pulpit that what they really need is to let the Divine Presence take care of wage negotiations. We knew that Buchman was making progress, but until we read the National Catholic Welfare Conference statement, recently issued, on "The Church and the Social Order" we didn't know he had so many followers among the hierarchy. It reads strikingly like the platform of a major political party. The hierarchy is for private property—but the labor of a human being must not be regarded as a commodity. Wages ought not to be so high as to ruin the employer—but they ought not to be so low that the employee cannot live decently. Both workers and employers ought to organize, but labor monopolies are as bad as capitalist monopolies—particularly when they lead to "violence, riot, and disorder." Economic liberalism, that is, of the Hoover-Lippmann variety, is no good—but neither is communism-socialism. "Social incoherence and class conflict must be replaced by corporate unity and organic function"—is this a plea for the Catholic "corporate state" envisaged in the encyclical "Quadragesimo Anno"? The new statement has been hailed as the most important since the organization of the National Catholic Welfare Conference in 1919. But we will let the reader in on a secret. The social program announced at that time—no doubt owing to the infiltration of Bolsheviks into the hierarchy—was a good deal more concrete. It advocated among other things federal legislation against child labor. The new slogan seems to be, "Let God do it."

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THE RESTORATION OF A TWO-CENTS-A-MILE fare on the Eastern railways by order of the Interstate Commerce Commission should be welcomed by everyone, including the railways that fought it. For despite determined assertions to the contrary by officials of the Pennsylvania and New York Central, the evidence indicates quite clearly that the roads do better financially at the two-cent rate than at two and a half cents. Absolute proof of this contention is, of course, impossible since the volume of passenger traffic is affected by other factors which cannot be isolated. But the long-term fate of the roads plainly depends on their regaining some of the traffic lost to busses and private motor cars. The two-cent rate is competitive, while the higher rate is distinctly a handicap. A large share of the credit for the I. C. C.'s decision should be given to Daniel C. Willard, president of the Baltimore and Ohio, who has fought single-handed for lower fares against the officials of the other roads.



UNTIL A FEW YEARS AGO SYPHILIS WAS AN unmentionable word in any popular newspaper. Now in a picture entitled "Dr. Ehrlich's Magic Bullet" it is being used for the first time in a film, with the full approval of the Hays office and the enthusiastic blessing of the United States Public Health Service. Thus slowly we are shedding the taboos which in the past have added to the difficulties of eradicating venereal disease. Warner Brothers are to be congratulated for treating the subject with excellent taste and at the same time creating a picture which conveys the real drama of scientific research. Besides being a great scientist Ehrlich was a Jew, but it never occurred to him that the value of a discovery might depend on the racial origins of the discoverer. The present rulers of Germany think otherwise. In fact, it is credibly reported that "606"—the magic bullet which Ehrlich found to kill the spirochetes of syphilis—is *verboten* in the Third Reich.

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FREDA KIRCHWEY, WHOSE WEEKLY ARTICLE is omitted from this issue, has just left for a tour of Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. She plans to send back reports of important recent developments in these islands, including a discussion of the project for settlement of Jewish refugees in Santo Domingo.

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WILLIAM E. DODD WAS A GENUINE JEFFERSONIAN Democrat. Faith in the common man and a deep belief in human equality were the springs which enriched his contributions to history and determined his own conduct in public life. It was inevitable that his tenure as ambassador in Berlin should have been stormy. Dodd had a strong affection for Germany. He took his doctorate there and wrote his first book—on Jefferson—in German. He translated the great German historian Lamprecht, and when he left for Berlin it was in the belief that "economic and social cooperation" between this country and the land "of Luther, Stein, and Bismarck" was of great importance. But he soon found that he had not come to the land of Luther and Stein, or even of Bismarck, but to a strange and uncomfortable country. Dodd was no professional diplomat, no pourer of tea on troubled waters. His courage and his outspoken language soon made him persona non grata not only with the Hitler regime but with the State Department "cookie pushers" he detested. Germany made him physically ill, and he never really regained his health; he was unable to finish the history of the Old South that was to have been his major work. His writing and his teaching have left their impress on American life. His courage gave voice to the silenced millions of the Third Reich.

HENRY RAYMOND MUSSEY'S NAME FIRST appeared on *The Nation's* masthead, as managing editor, in the issue of February 7, 1918. It was war time; Mussey gave up the security of his Columbia professorship of economics for an adventure in crusading journalism. *The Nation*, after four decades' association, was divorcing itself from the *New York Evening Post* and assuming that editorial independence which has kept it in hot water ever since. Mussey shared with Oswald Garrison Villard the responsibility of guiding *The Nation* through the sharpest change of direction in its history. Old subscribers canceled; new ones poured in; costs mounted; the government attempted suppression. Mussey carried on. After the crisis he returned to the university field, coming back to *The Nation* briefly in the Hoover years. He had never wholly left it, but most of his contributions were characteristically anonymous. So, too, though he was a keen interpreter of the quagmires of economics, he never was dogmatic enough to compose a book; his academic heritage is rather in the living minds of his students than on the university shelves.

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## Japan's New Strategy

ALL signs indicate that the Far Eastern war is about to enter a new stage. The Japanese have officially announced that they will not expand their operations in the future, but will stand pat and seek to hold their previous conquests. This represents a fundamental shift in Japanese policy. Heretofore the Japanese have boasted that they would chase Chiang Kai-shek to Tibet, if necessary. There was no place for an anti-Japanese government in the "new order for East Asia." Now, it seems, Chiang is to be allowed to continue to rule in the areas of "free China" at present governed from Chungking. A glance at the map shows that this is a considerable area. Out of the eighteen provinces of China proper, the Chinese armies are still completely in control of eight and largely in control of five. Even in the coastal regions of the northeast, where the Japanese conquest has been most sweeping, Chinese guerrilla units, acting under orders from Chungking, dominate the entire back country.

The Japanese decision is clearly the result of military necessity rather than political sagacity. Five times recently the Japanese have sought to extend the area under their control. And on each occasion, after an initial success, they have suffered a severe reverse. The repulse of the Japanese drive on Changsha, capital of Hunan, still stands as the major Japanese defeat in the war. But it was followed by signal Chinese victories north of Canton and in Shansi. Conflicting claims leave the results of the recent Japanese drives against the communications with Indo-China and in Inner Mongolia still far from clear. About all we can be sure of is that the Japanese are back where they started and that they failed in their effort to cut the vital Indo-China-Yunnan railway. Although two bombing raids made on the road from the advanced Japanese position in Pinyang did considerable damage, they apparently caused only a temporary interruption of service. Less is known about the operations in Inner Mongolia, but the Japanese withdrawal from an area which would be of strategic importance in the event of a war with the Soviet Union can scarcely indicate a Japanese victory. Similarly, operations against Ningpo, the largest port still in Chinese hands, appear to have ended in failure.

All these developments suggest that Japan has no longer the capacity to organize a sustained offensive. The Japanese army, mired in the vastness of China, has found itself unable to deliver a decisive blow against the Chinese forces. At home, the shortage of coal and power resources, combined with a lack of imported raw materials, is seriously cutting down the material supremacy on which past Japanese victories have been based. Only one course, then, is open to Tokyo—to attempt to consolidate its gains as quickly as possible. But

even here there are grave difficulties. Facing incessant guerrilla attacks whose success is dependent on the support of the local peasantry, the Japanese have long realized that their greatest hope lies in organizing a puppet regime which would command a measure of support from the Chinese. For this purpose, Wang Ching-wei's defection seemed a godsend, since Wang at one time had an immense popular following. But nearly a year has now passed since the Japanese began to talk of setting up a Wang Ching-wei regime. Its inauguration has been repeatedly postponed, presumably awaiting a major Japanese victory. The real test of Japan's latest strategy will come after the launching of the puppet government. This regime will doubtless command a certain amount of support both at home and abroad. It may even seriously undermine the unity with which the Chinese people have thus far opposed Japanese aggression. But this possibility seems to have been materially diminished by the repeated delays and the recent Chinese victories. Wang has lost several of his most prominent supporters, and the Japanese have made no progress in inducing other leading Chinese to play traitor to their country. As long as this is the case, Japan's efforts to consolidate its rule are destined to frustration. The war will continue until one side or the other is completely exhausted. While Japan is far from beaten, China's chances of ultimate victory seem better than at any time to date.

## Four Negroes

ON THE night of Saturday, May 13, 1933, an elderly white man was robbed and murdered in Pompano, Florida. In a Southern town, when any crime is committed, the police instinctively reach for a Negro. One may dimly imagine the atmosphere when there has been a murder. In Pompano a convict guard appeared on the scene with bloodhounds. Nearly forty members of the Negro community were rounded up and taken to the county jail. No warrants had been issued for their arrest. No formal charges were filed against them. They were not permitted to communicate with relatives or friends, much less counsel. One by one, and over and over again for a week, each of the suspects was taken to a room of the jail for questioning. There he was confronted by four to ten men—the county sheriff, his deputies, the convict guard, and other white officers and citizens. The "questioning," one may be sure, was not purely a contest of dialectical skill. The third degree, particularly for Negroes in the South, does not confine itself to the classic form of the Socratic dialogue. On the night of Saturday, May 20, a week after the murder, the suspects were still denying that they had had anything to do with the crime. That night the sheriff and his aides, amateur and official, set to with new determina-

tion. The jail cook stood by to serve them coffee and sandwiches as they applied the full force of their logic to the prisoners. On Sunday morning one confessed, but the state's attorney, when shown the confession, was dissatisfied. "Tear this paper up," he said, "that isn't what I want. When you get something worth while call me." The rebuke may not have improved the temper of the police authorities, but it stimulated their efforts. Early next morning one prisoner had made a "worth-while" confession, and three others, one of whom had been kept in the death cell, also "broke." On the basis of these confessions the four Negroes were convicted and sentenced to death.

This story is one to make all Americans ashamed. The Pompano affair—by no means unusual in the South—indicates how far we have to go before the ideals in which we believe have been fully embodied in the lives we lead. It reflects racial inequality, mob spirit, brutal disregard for the most precious and fundamental rights, lawlessness in the guise of law. Dr. Goebbels collects just such items for retorts to our protests on Nazi mistreatment of the Jews. But we venture to say that though Dr. Goebbels may file this particular story away, he will forget where he placed it. For it has a happy ending of which we may all as Americans be proud. The four Negroes convicted in Florida were obscure and humble men. No political or economic issue was present in their case to mobilize vast protest. But the creaking machinery of the law kept them alive for almost seven years, and the Supreme Court has now set them free. Speaking through a Southerner who had himself once been a member of the Ku Klux Klan, a unanimous court declared, "To permit human lives to be forfeited upon confessions thus obtained would make of the constitutional requirement of due process a meaningless symbol." The court grappled here with a problem that was a severe test of the symbols on which its own power rests. It had to fight our worst form of race prejudice. It had to stand fast against the tide of the white man's unconscious fears in the Black Belt. It had to overcome the usual excuses put forward for law-enforcement agencies when they wink at the law. It passed that test. "Tyrannical governments," Justice Black warned for the court, have "immemorially utilized dictatorial criminal procedure and punishment to make scapegoats of the weak or of helpless political, religious, or racial minorities and those who differed, who would not conform, and who resisted tyranny." We take out the stock of words required for comment, and find them all dirtied by hypocrisy and encrusted with cant. "The majesty of the law"; "equal justice"; "democratic processes"; "American ideals." We put the words away. All we can say is that the Supreme Court saved the lives of four Negroes. And saved something precious for the rest of us, too.

## Wagnerian Socialism

THE newly concluded Russian-German trade pact has been hailed in the Nazi press as the practical equivalent of a defeat of the Allied blockade. It will result, according to semi-official estimates, in an exchange of goods amounting to upward of a billion marks annually, enabling Germany to make good its chief shortages of food and raw materials. Despite this ballyhoo there is not much evidence of an actual flow of commodities westward from Russia, which appears to have little surplus to export. In addition, transport difficulties, accentuated by the severe winter and the demands of the Finnish war, seem to be proving a formidable barrier.

But if trade in goods between the two dictatorships languishes, ideological commerce is flourishing. To an ever-increasing extent Goebbels's brass bands are interweaving the strains of the Internationale with the themes of *Lebensraum* and Nordic superiority. Britain is now being portrayed, not merely as the implacable enemy of the German Reich, but as the head and front of international capitalism, with whose destruction a new socialist millennium will open. Hitler in his last speech spoke of a "social war between nations in which the have-nots are fighting the haves for a new division of the world." Following this speech Nazi press and publicists have increasingly class-angled their propaganda. Dr. Robert Ley, head of the Labor Front, which is assuming a much more important role under the new policy, declared in a recent speech: "The National Socialist state leadership has not only destroyed plutocracy in Germany and allotted to money its proper role in economy, it has also freed the workers from the exploiters' fetters." This accomplished, it proposes to release the British and French workers from their bondage to capitalism and bestow on them the manifold blessings of National Socialism—a society in which every activity that is not forbidden is compulsory.

It would seem that this accent on socialism is intended primarily to influence domestic opinion and particularly to drum up enthusiasm for the regime and the war among the German workers. According to the *Inside Germany Reports*, published by the Friends of German Freedom, an attitude of unfriendly reserve toward the Nazis became prevalent when the war started. The German workers had always dreaded war, and their already low standard of living was further reduced by rationing and by the cancelation of payment for overtime and holiday work. Passive resistance seems to have led to reduced output, despite longer hours, and recently it was found necessary to restore overtime pay and to increase rations for employees of the heavy industries. But the workers' morale still leaves much to be desired from the point of view of the Nazi chiefs. Hence the effort to

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create a feeling of unity with the party and the state by revamping the anti-capitalist slogans of international socialism.

Propaganda of this kind may also be intended to stir up disunity in the enemy's camp. Certainly it gears in well with the furious anti-imperialist campaign which is being conducted underground by the French Communists and openly by their British comrades. These same campaigners, however, did an effective job in the years prior to August last in helping to convince British and French workers that fascism was the enemy, and Dr. Ley is hardly likely to change this opinion, however skilfully he wraps himself in a red flag. Beneath this disguise the

cloven hoof of Nazism shows all too plainly, and the Berlin version of the Internationale cannot rid itself of its Wagnerian overtones: the *Urbemensch Leitmotiv* insists on breaking in. "Workers of all lands, including English and French workers—unite," cried Dr. Ley. "Combine to annihilate the old English dragon which blocks the treasures of the earth. . . . Your common enemy is English Jewish-democratic high finance." Plainly the Nazi Siegfried would like to borrow the sword of socialism. But we can be sure that if and when the British Fafnir is slain he will create a new monster compared with which that rather tired old dragon will be seen in retrospect as almost domesticated.

## The Lewis-Roosevelt Feud

BY KENNETH G. CRAWFORD

Washington, February 15

THERE is no longer room for doubt about the seriousness of the breach between the President of the United States and the president of the United Mine Workers. Even after Mr. Lewis's speech at Columbus predicting ignominious defeat for the President if he runs for a third term, a few hopeful liberals clung to the theory that it was a fake fight. The C. I. O. chief, they insisted, was merely building a backfire on the left to save the New Deal from the flames of reaction on the right—and with the consent, expressed or implied, of the White House. But the Roosevelt and Lewis speeches to the American Youth Congress revealed fundamental and apparently irreconcilable differences. They went beyond mere disagreement over rate of progression toward a common goal.

In the beginning the Roosevelt-Lewis feud had seemed to be the outgrowth of such a disagreement. The President, a master-politician sensitive to every change in public opinion, had slowed down the New Deal after the 1938 Congressional elections to let the country catch up. By the turn of the election year 1940 the Administration had come to a dead stop—no new reforms, reduction of government spending, and reliance on foreign orders to keep the national plant in full-time operation. To Lewis, who judges national welfare from the condition of the under-dog's coat and who has little patience



Drawing by Strom

John L. Lewis

with the fickleness of middle-class opinion, this slow-down looked like a sit-down and was too much to bear. With 8,000,000 to 10,000,000 unemployed, political expediency was not an acceptable excuse for inaction.

The issue finally was joined on a question of foreign policy. In speaking to the Youth Congress delegates the President scoffed at apprehensions about his proposal to extend help to beleaguered Finland. Such help could not possibly lead the United States into war. Talk about the danger of loans to Finland was "twaddle" inspired by sympathy for Russia. The youngsters hadn't in-

formed themselves. Speaking to the same audience a few hours later Lewis pointed out that his full-grown miners also had gone on record against loans to Finland because they feared involvement in the war.

The Finnish loan question may not be big enough in itself to split the liberal movement. But it is the handle to a bigger ax. Blocked on the domestic front by a hopelessly conservative Congress, the President must look to Europe for business. Finnish business wouldn't help much, but useful precedents might be established in the process of getting and financing it. More important, 98 per cent of the American people—the President's own estimate—sympathize with Finland. At least as large a proportion, it can be assumed, hate Communist Russia. Help for Finland obviously has emotional appeal and is



good politics, which is not to imply that the President is insincere in its advocacy. Just as obviously, encouragement of the youths who oppose loans for Finland, presumably because of communistic leanings, is not very good politics.

Roosevelt had the popular side in the Youth Congress debate even though he got the boos and his critic the applause. Lewis apparently realized this. Two nights later, speaking at the Broun memorial meeting in New York, he said: "After all, my friends, no one man, no spirit, no matter how valiant, can turn itself alone against the great national mountains of indifference, self-satisfaction, and complacency."

But Lewis is not a spirit to tire easily, and he is not alone. His position on the Finnish question has made him a figure around whom the forces of the extreme left, badly demoralized by Russian collaboration with Germany in Poland and by the subsequent Russian invasion of Finland, can rally. These forces are numerically weak, but they are resourceful and persistent. In opposing the Roosevelt foreign policy they will find allies among the simon-pure isolationists, the peace advocates, and the militant laborites who regard foreign adventure, even though it is confined to peaceful assistance to belligerents, as a poor excuse for abandoning the home fight.

That Lewis consciously planned to form and lead such an alliance is doubtful. His Youth Congress speech was extemporaneous and had the ring of indignant spontaneity.

Whether he planned it or not, Lewis has become the leader of an isolated left. Where he is going to lead it is a question. Assuming that Roosevelt does not himself run again, the Democratic nominee almost certainly will be to the right of the New Deal. No Republican who has a chance for the nomination can be acceptable to Lewis. His renewed offer to make peace with the A. F. of L. at once and settle the details at leisure has been turned down, which probably means that the labor wars will continue at least until after the election. This will encourage Congress to whittle down the Wagner Act and the wage-hour law before adjournment of the current session.

The break between Roosevelt and Lewis probably was inevitable. They are determined men, each used to having his way, and their individual brands of liberalism, while similar in objective, are compounded of dissimilar ingredients. That the blow-up should have come on the eve of a national election in which liberalism will need all its power to breast a strong reaction is more than unfortunate. It may be disastrous.

## Marxism Reconsidered—II

BY LEWIS COREY

THE turmoil, changes, and problems of our age merge into one dominant fact: capitalism is being transformed. What, in the light of radical experience and frustration, do we need for the job of directing that transformation toward a desirable social order? We need a program of readjustments designed, first, to solve the economic crisis and, second, to set in motion the forces of transition toward the new order. We need tactics for the transition that will maintain and strengthen those democratic procedures and values that, going beyond capitalism, are achievements of civilization itself. We need an understanding of the institutional arrangements that are necessary to overcome the totalitarian potential in collectivism and to make collectivism democratic. There must be, finally, the harmony of ends and means; if means devour ends, victory will spell defeat for the purposes with which we started.

An aid to the understanding of those needs is found in an examination of the failure of Marxist radicalism, since no other movement has developed so much theory and practice on the problems of transition to a new order. The failure, I believe, must be blamed upon two funda-

mental limitations in the traditional socialist and Marxist conceptions of the transition from capitalism to socialism—misunderstanding of democracy, and emphasis on the proletariat as the "carrier" of socialism; from these flow other limitations of theory and practice.

Marx misunderstood democracy because he saw in the democratic struggle simply a means for proletarian seizure of power and dictatorship, a "catastrophic" conception of the transition from capitalism to socialism which, as we have seen in Russia, crushes the developing forces of democracy and leads to totalitarianism. While the revolutionary tactics of Marx were rejected by the traditional socialism that arose in Europe after the 1870's, democracy was misunderstood in another sense. Socialism was still identified with democracy, but was given several new twists. It was now a reformist struggle for greater democracy within capitalism, in a Europe still strewn with feudal survivals. The new creed was that democracy, a fully democratic capitalism, with gradually increasing government ownership and control of industry would "inevitably" move toward socialism.

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greater democratic rights and political power; its social position was improved by greater material well-being, social legislation, and popular education. But other forces were at work. Democratic capitalism moved toward an economic collectivism of monopoly capital and a permanent economic crisis which were to unloose totalitarian forces. It now became necessary to broaden the struggle for democracy into a struggle for socialism. Democracy cannot survive and grow unless collectivism is democratized and the economic crisis is solved through progressive transformation of capitalism. Otherwise capitalist democracy will "inevitably" move toward fascism, which is wholly compatible with government ownership and control of industry. But traditional socialism could not break the entanglements of its accepted theory and practice. The defense of democracy in Germany met defeat because the Social Democrats and their allies were unable either to democratize collectivism or to solve the economic crisis that fed the devouring flames of fascism.

#### THE PROLETARIAT IS NOT ENOUGH

Disastrous, too, was the emphasis on the proletariat as the "carrier" of socialism, a theory which was bound up with the misunderstanding of democracy. There was, to be sure, historical justification for the emphasis. Against the utopian socialists who wanted to solve the social problem behind the back of society, Marx was right in wanting to give socialism a rational, material social basis; and in his day none but the brutally exploited proletariat could be identified with socialism, since all other classes saw their interests realized in the upswing of capitalism. Identifying the socialist mission with the proletariat broadened its consciousness and moral sense; the proletariat tackled its own tasks all the more vigorously because they were identified with larger historical tasks. Socialism was a tremendous human, cultural, and moral force among the workers, who were largely excluded from the benefits of capitalist civilization. But the proletarian emphasis proved historically justified only as long as the workers were struggling for greater democratic rights and well-being within capitalism. When the fight finally became a struggle for socialism itself, the emphasis on the proletariat revealed its disastrous limitations.

As socialism approached political power, especially in Germany, it was immobilized by failure to get the support of the non-proletarian groups necessary for a democratic majority. The emphasis on the proletariat alienated the middle classes and peasants, who saw in socialism an expression only of proletarian interests. Political necessity forced socialism to make an appeal to those groups. But emphasis on the proletariat was not abandoned. The appeal was never a broadening of socialism, in theory and practice, to include the interests and action of useful social groups other than the workers. It was an appeal

of self-defeating opportunism. Socialism was watered down, virtually abandoned, to get the support of non-proletarian groups whose interests should have been unmistakably included in socialism and who should have been drawn into the struggle for socialism.

The contradictions between theory and practice created a split personality in traditional socialism which was expressed in an unprincipled and unwholesome combination of sectarianism and opportunism. Socialism was condemned to the futility of petty everyday tasks that had nothing to do with the transition from capitalism to socialism. The futility was rationalized in a "scientific" theory of the "inevitability of socialism"—an expression of the mystical faith in progress which ignores the fact that reaction may be as "inevitable" as progress.

While revolutionary emphasis on the proletariat led to the Bolshevik tragedy, the reformist emphasis converted traditional socialism into the political expression of "radical" trade unionism. But socialism cannot subordinate itself to unionism without still further limiting its appeal for non-proletarian groups. That is what happened in Germany: when the Social Democracy got government power after the World War it was revealed as simply a trade-union party. It made no effort to introduce measures to solve the economic crisis through progressive transformation of capitalism, or to break reactionary opposition by using those measures to arouse a people's movement for socialism. Solution of the crisis was left to the capitalists; it was considered their job. Social Democracy concentrated on the trade-union job of improving the workers' conditions within capitalism. Such a policy may work in a period of expanding capitalism, when the conditions of all classes are being improved; it is suicidal in a contracting economy, such as that of Germany in the 1920's, when gains for the workers spell losses for other classes. The burdens of the economic crisis were thrust upon the middle classes and peasants, who might have rallied to a socialism that solved the crisis but were repelled by a trade-union socialism that neglected their interests. They got their revenge in fascism.

#### FARMERS AND THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS

Emphasis on the proletariat is bound up with the failure of socialism to clarify its relation to other classes. That weakness, it now appears, is part of a larger failure—the failure to answer concretely the question, what is socialism? There never was a concrete understanding of what the socialist society was to be, beyond a collective ownership that we now see is compatible with totalitarianism; never a specific program of transition from capitalism to socialism; never a clear picture of where non-proletarian groups fit into socialism and the struggle for socialism. It seems an elementary conclusion to draw

that socialism must express and realize the interests of all useful functional groups within society. But that conclusion was never drawn, except left-handedly and abstractly as "the liberation of all humanity." As a result socialism misunderstood all classes except the proletariat, a disaster which, among others, enabled fascism to catch socialism unawares.

Socialism misunderstood and neglected the farmers. It waited for capitalist large-scale farming to convert independent farmers—and peasants—into "proletarians" fit for socialism. But large-scale farming did not develop as predicted, and the new technology made it possible to work small farms efficiently. There are more tenants than wage workers in modern agriculture; and agrarian "proletarians" remain farmers and refuse to flock to proletarian socialism. Farmers must be approached on the basis of their functional interests as farmers, not as potential proletarians or "allies of the proletariat." They must be assured the independent ownership they want, limited only by the regulations of self-governing cooperatives where farming is unavoidably large-scale. Collectivization is both unnecessary and undesirable; its use in Russia was determined largely by the dictatorship's need for an agrarian bureaucracy—which numbered 2,000,000 as early as 1931—to control the peasants. The farmers must be fitted into the socialist pattern without violence to their own way of life.

There also existed misunderstanding and neglect of the new middle class. Traditional socialism and Marxism were largely right about the old middle class of small independent enterprisers: its economic power has declined enormously under monopoly capitalism, although the class is still a factor with which socialism must reckon. But a new middle class has arisen that is more important than the old—the new class of salaried employees and professionals, which in the United States includes one out of every six persons gainfully employed. The traditional socialist and communist approach to this class is much too simple: that its members are proletarians or will become proletarians. That is true of the majority, in an objective economic sense, but not of all. Moreover, whether or not they are "proletarians," members of the new middle class remain members of a class other than the proletariat, a class which performs different functions. And these are functions that carry beyond capitalism because they are the technical, administrative, and managerial functions of economic collectivism. The upper layers of the new middle class perform the job of organizing and directing industry, which was the capitalist's job before collectivism separated ownership from management. Whether collectivism is capitalist, fascist, communist, or democratic socialist, its higher functions are performed by members of the new middle class. This class, like the farmers, must be addressed on the basis of the services it can contribute to a

socialist society and the benefits it can derive from one. This functional approach reveals more understanding and assures a greater unity than the class approach, with its tortured and ambiguous emphasis on the proletariat.

Continued misunderstanding and neglect may drive the new middle class to fascism. There are totalitarian elements in this class, especially in the upper layers, which come in contact with the reactionary big capitalists. The class now controls the managerial functions of a monopoly collectivism in which there is a totalitarian potential. One expression of that potential is the hierarchical and authoritarian set-up of corporate industry. The totalitarian potential is strengthened if the economic and the political bureaucracy are combined. There are in the new middle class, moreover, traditional prejudices and passions: the authoritarianism of industrial and scientific experts who imagine that socially, too, there is only "one right way" of doing things (their way), attitudes of contempt for the mass of people, consciousness of class and racial superiority, and the hunger for invidious distinctions and privileges. These manifestations in the new middle class may explode in fascism if insecurity and desperation are increased by failure to solve the economic crisis or to move toward a democratic collectivism.

#### ACCENT ON DEMOCRACY

The danger cannot be overcome by "revolutionary" struggle against the new middle class; that would surely mean fascism. Resort to violence in Russia was successful largely because the new middle class was small and fascism not yet invented. Violence in an advanced country like the United States would be fatal, because the new middle class is large and can dispose of more of today's specialized violence than the proletariat. It would be fatal, too, even if it were immediately successful. The ensuing dictatorship would cancel the advantage of our higher economic, democratic, and cultural levels, which should make it easier to build democratic socialism here than in Russia. And, most important, dictatorship over the new middle class would ultimately be converted into a dictatorship by that class over the workers and farmers. The trained personnel of that class must be called upon to administer the bureaucratic posts in government and industry; the class sneaks into power. That is what happened in Russia. For who are they who carry on the totalitarian dictatorship of Russian communism in the name of the workers? Members of what we call the new middle class: the bureaucracy in party, government, and industry, the officials, managers, and technicians, the trade-union functionaries, the professionals and intellectuals. It makes no difference that many of Russia's new bureaucratic middle class rose from the ranks of workers and peasants; so did many capitalists.

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the class must be drawn into the struggle for socialism. It can be done. The members of that class suffer from capitalist economic breakdown and not from the demands of the workers; they must reject the petty struggle to defend themselves against the workers, which leads to totalitarianism, for the bigger and nobler struggle to construct a democratic collectivism that will liberate and develop their functional talents. Totalitarianism offers privileges to the new middle class only under reactionary and oppressive conditions. Inherent in totalitarianism are insecurity and servility, suppression of independence and corruption of personality, degradation of the human spirit. Inherent also are limitation and distortion of economic progress, which limit functional services and lower standards of living, and the political and cultural reaction that drives toward a new barbarism. Against that totalitarian nightmare democratic collectivism offers security, freedom, and dignity.

Members of the new middle class will occupy positions of privilege and power in democratic socialism, as in any conceivable new order of the immediate future. So be it. It is not dangerous if the larger capitalist privileges and power are destroyed and if there is democracy which permits freedom of discussion and action to limit what privileges remain and to prevent abuse of power.

The accent is on democracy. Bolshevism started with an absolute equality—no income higher than a skilled worker's—which is now brutal inequality with protest and action completely stifled.

If socialism becomes the expression and realization of the interests of all useful functional groups, it is transformed into a people's socialism. What becomes of the class concept? It is transformed from a source of confusion and ambiguity into a tool of social engineering; a tool with which to identify and delimit those class interests that must be destroyed in order to realize progressive class interests; a tool with which to gauge the strength and weakness of the different functional groups that make up the people, their relation to one another and to ends and means. The older class concept has been historically outlived; it gave rise to millennial abstractions, such as "workers' rule" and "workers' state," which dangerously distort both means and ends—means because support that is imperative for a democratic transition to socialism is alienated; ends because "workers' rule" and "workers' state" become in practice a dictatorship over the workers themselves.

[Part I of this article appeared last week. In the concluding section, which will appear in our next issue, Mr. Corey will suggest a transitional program.]

## Has the War Changed France?

BY ALEXANDER WERTH

Paris, January 30

ON THE east coast of England and Scotland they have been bombing trawlers and machine-gunning fishing boats. So far France has not experienced any such "frightfulness," and the war continues, after four and a half months, to be "this queer war," *cette drôle de guerre*. Of the five million men mobilized not more than thirty thousand or so have had any direct contact with the enemy; and the rest of the troops, and with them the rest of the country, are waiting. As I write I can see from my window the usual merry-go-round of cars and taxis in the cold but sunlit Place de l'Opéra; and armies of women are flocking past on their way to the January sales at the Galeries Lafayette. Carpeaux's Danse outside the Opéra building is covered with sandbags; and in the shop round the corner they are advertising some kind of tarred-paper vest, at twelve francs apiece, which "will keep the troops warm." But apart from little things like that Paris looks much the same as it did before the war.

Food, which is already a problem in England, is scarcely a problem here. You can't eat meat on Fridays—

for a Catholic country that is no hardship—and you can't eat certain varieties of meat on Mondays and Tuesdays. There are, occasionally, temporary shortages in coffee and in peanut and olive oil. Otherwise, there is plenty of everything, especially if you have the money to pay for it. Not that the cost of living has gone up very much, but incomes have gone down in many cases. Paul Reynaud, the Finance Minister, considers this essential; the "reduction of purchasing power" is one of the pillars of his war finance. The soldiers' wives are certainly much worse off than they were in peace time. A woman with two children receives only twenty-one francs a day to live on if she is in Paris and only sixteen francs fifty in the provinces. The working class is less well paid than it was before the war; it has been estimated that when account is taken of the 15 per cent war surtax on wages—in the case of men of "mobilizable" age—the fall in hourly wages is about 25 per cent. This is partly made up by overtime pay, but not to any great extent. But these are little hardships. Paul Reynaud has told France that "it has no idea yet of the sufferings and privations that will be demanded from it before the war is won."

In a country of forty million people, five million—that is, the greater part of its manhood, and its most productive part—are in the army. In the rear the work is carried on by the rest of the men, including those with *affectations spéciales* (roughly the equivalent of the British "reserved occupations"), and by the women. Female labor is employed on an ever-increasing scale in the armament works. Officially 900,000 men have been given *affectations spéciales* (these include the armament workers, the railwaymen and other transport workers, and miners); in reality, the number of mobilizable men who have remained in the rear is believed to be nearly twice that number. One hears it said, especially by men home on leave, that the proportion of peasants in the army seems abnormally high. M. Daladier has just set up a commission to inquire into the whole problem of "reserved occupations"; one of the tasks of this commission will be to set down more precise criteria of "indispensability" for those who wish to stay behind. All this, however, does not mean that France, or even a large part of France, has not its heart in the war.

Generally speaking, it may be said that France entered this war because it considered war inevitable. The French people had had enough of the "war of nerves," with those partial mobilizations every six months which in the end created in every French home a sense of insecurity that became truly intolerable. They were not willing to wait until Hitler had made himself strong enough to swallow England and France outright. Instinctively they knew that it was "now or never"; this last opportunity of stopping the progress of Hitlerism in Europe had to be seized. If in 1938 opinion on "giving Hitler a last chance" was divided, it was so no longer. Moreover, the country's leaders felt that France and England were better prepared for war than they were in 1938, for both British and French rearmament had made enormous progress in the preceding twelve months. Ciano made it plain in a recent speech that Germany had struck much too soon, and that this was one of the reasons why Italy dropped out.

*Il faut en finir* was the "peace aim" with which the French people entered this war, and at that moment they did not trouble about any of those other "peace aims" which continue to preoccupy some of our left-wing intellectuals in England. The French had no illusions about Hitlerism being one thing and the German people quite another. For had not the German people loudly applauded every crime of Hitler's—the march into Vienna, the seizure of Prague, the destruction of Warsaw?

While there has been less reflection in France than in England on "peace aims," one idea, at least, has caught on—that of some kind of Anglo-French federation which could become the starting-point for a wider European federation, though not, as Daladier said, "without material guaranties." This phrase, incidentally, was cheered

from one end of the Chamber of Deputies to the other. France's distrust of Germany is complete; Herriot summed it up when he said, "We must make sure that our sons do not have to fight another war in twenty years' time." What the "material guaranties" are to be has not been stated by Daladier; some interpret the phrase as meaning, among other things, the creation of a buffer state on the left bank of the Rhine, a guaranty which France abandoned in 1919 for the abortive Anglo-American guaranty, and the reconstruction in one form or another, with or without the Hapsburgs, of a "Danubian federation." What encourages France and England in their federalist ideas is the fact that in this war the neutrals are suffering even more from the German menace than are England and France, and will not soon forget it. Brussels and Amsterdam and Copenhagen and Bucharest are much more uncomfortable places to live in today than London and Paris.



Premier Daladier

How long it will take to win the war and what terrible sacrifices may have to be made no one can say, but the conviction is general in France

that it will be won. No doubt the Germans are reckoning, or have been until recently, on the eventual demoralization of the French army if it is kept long enough in a state of inactivity behind the Maginot Line; even some Frenchmen say: "We can stand a bloody war as long as necessary, but we shall not stand a bloodless war for longer than eighteen months." This kind of utterance, however, need not be taken literally. In any case, the French General Staff has done all it could to keep the troops busy; it has greatly strengthened the Maginot Line by increasing its depth, and has vastly developed the fortifications on the Belgian and Swiss borders. The soldiers may be "bored," but they have not been wasting their time. Germany has also relied, as one can see from its propaganda, on pacifist and anti-British currents in the French army, but this propaganda has failed completely, if only because every Frenchman knows that Great Britain has already lost many more men than France in this war and is bearing the brunt of the war on the seas, where it is being fought in real earnest.

The spirit of the French army is extremely good. Combining discipline and camaraderie, it is truly republican in spirit, and there is a freedom of discussion in the army among soldiers and officers alike which is unknown in the rear. The French army is essentially democratic, and

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unlike some British majors of the old-school-tie variety, no French officer would ever dream of objecting to eating in the same restaurant as a poilu. For if the French private respects his officer, it is not by virtue of any social considerations, but simply because he knows the officer's qualifications to be higher and his responsibility greater. Such is the real basis of the republican discipline of the French army.

A question that has greatly worried some English left-wing intellectuals is whether France is still a democracy. The spirit of the French army seems a sufficient guaranty that, whatever may ultimately happen to the "democratic institutions" of France, its democratic spirit will remain intact. But in war time—and in this may be included the six or seven months that preceded the war—the government has been obliged to discard certain democratic principles. France is under a censorship; the decree of November 19 giving prefects discretionary powers to deport and imprison suspect persons is scarcely democratic; and the treatment of the Communists has been such as to cause a great deal of worry to democratic purists in England. However, one has to consider the simple fact that Stalinist propaganda in France is in reality the same as Hitler propaganda; it is sufficient to compare the copies of the clandestine *Humanité* with the radio talks of Paul Feronnet, "the traitor of Stuttgart," to see that there is mighty little to choose between the two. Both bellow against the "war of the British imperialists," for whom the people of France are shedding their blood, and some weeks ago it was a German airplane which flew one day over the Paris region and dropped leaflets printed in Moscow. As Frossard said in his speech in the Chamber of Deputies on January 16, "Stalin has placed at Hitler's disposal a valuable weapon—his disruptive propaganda among the French working class."

As for the expulsion of the Communists from the Chamber, it is well to remember that this was decided upon not by a mere government decree but by the unanimous vote of the French Parliament, and the Socialists themselves voted for the expulsion of their one-time comrades in the Front Populaire. What was voted was a *loi d'exception*—which in the annals of the French Republic is not unprecedented. In the past *lois d'exception*, particularly against members of the former ruling dynasties, have been voted in defense of the regime. The *loi d'exception* against the Communists was voted not merely in defense of the regime but in defense of France. Frossard, who cannot be suspected of being undemocratic, declared that "if communism is an opinion, Stalinism at the present time is a form of treason." France is still a democracy, but one that is run on the principle of *salut public*. Herriot, another man who could not by the widest stretch of the imagination be called anti-democratic, recalled in

this connection the First Republic and its way of dealing with people guilty of collusion with enemy powers. This does not mean that the *salut public* regime is perfect. Far from it. Abuses and injustices have occurred. The censorship is often guilty of both arbitrariness and incompetence; and some of the sentences passed on rank-and-file Communists for "defeatist utterances" have been absurdly stiff.

A valid objection raised to the expulsion of the Communist deputies is that strong action has not at the same time been taken against certain persons, political figures and others, who are still guilty of "Hitlerite sympathies," and who have not got out of their system the poison of the old Nazi "anti-Communist" ("Hitler the defender of European civilization"), anti-British, and anti-Semitic slogans—a poison pumped into them for years by the laborious propaganda of German agents like Otto Abetz and Feronnet, both of whom used to be *personae gratae* in certain high quarters. Henri de Kerillis, the nationalist deputy, did well to ventilate the whole question, first in a series of articles in the *Epoque*, and later in a Chamber speech on January 16. His speech aroused great anger on some of the right-wing benches, where not all consciences were quite clear, at least as regards past contacts and sympathies. Kerillis did not mention any names in either his articles or his speech, but his *dossier* has now gone before the military authorities; and M. Sarraut, the Minister of the Interior, who said not long ago that "the prisoners' carts were ready," may soon get busy on an investigation.

Though not without danger, this propaganda, whether Nazi or Communist, cannot have very much effect; it is certainly not going to change the determination of the majority of the French people to go on with the war. The Stalin-Hitler pact caused the greatest confusion among the Communist rank and file; and although many of them refused for a long time to dissociate themselves from the dissolved Communist Party—partly for reasons of "party loyalty" and partly out of a general dislike of the Daladier government—few could have had any illusions that the Stalin-Hitler pact was in the interests of France, peace, or the working class. In the last two months the Communist cause in France has suffered several severe blows: first, the invasion of Finland, which the Communist rank and file found very difficult to swallow; then the setbacks of the Red Army, which greatly discredited Stalin in their eyes; and, lastly, the unanimous vote of the French Chamber expelling the Communist deputies. One has, indeed, to be fanatical to close one's eyes to the fact that the whole of French opinion, as represented by Parliament, has denounced the Communists as traitors. The moral weight of such a vote is far greater than that of any government decree would have been, for government action might have been attributed to "reactionary" influences.



## Japan's Red Flirtation

BY FRED A UTLEY

HAVING for years endeavored to convince the West that Japan is fighting communism in China, the Japanese press is now threatening that "Japan will be driven into the Soviet camp" if the United States embargoes materials for the Japanese war machine. Japanese propagandists no longer attempt to disguise the fact that it is Chinese nationalism which Japan is striving to destroy and do not hesitate to proclaim that it may accept Communist assistance in order to conquer China. The new line shows signs of being more successful than the old, and the threat of a Russo-Japanese pact is taken seriously by many persons in Great Britain and America. Columnists whose wide knowledge of Europe is matched by their ignorance concerning the Far East warn newspaper readers that the United States should hold its hand lest Japan follow Germany's example. Without pausing to study Japan's economic position and trade relations, or the great differences between its situation and Germany's, they tremble before the bogey of the bolshevization of China through a Russo-Japanese pact.

There is, in fact, no similarity between the situation of Japan and that of Germany. Germany is not dependent on the British Empire and the United States for most of its imports or to take its goods. Germany has the greatest heavy industry in Europe, whereas Japan is the weakest of the great powers in this respect. Japan's production of pig iron, including that produced in Korea and Manchuria, is less than 4 million tons a year, against Germany's 19 million; its production of steel is a mere 6 million tons, against Germany's 23 million (plus 3 million from Czechoslovakia and Austria); the Japanese Empire's production of coal is 60 million tons, against the Reich's 200 million. Germany, moreover, makes practically all kinds of machinery as well as any country in the world or better, whereas Japan cannot manufacture certain important types at all. And Germany of course leads the world in various branches of engineering and chemistry. Iron ore, it is true, must be imported by Germany, but it is obtained from Sweden, and Sweden has no choice but to sell it to the Reich. Japan makes its steel out of iron imported from the British Empire and scrap from the United States; the British now require these supplies for themselves, and the United States need not sell to Japan.

Naturally Japan has become increasingly dependent upon the United States since the European war began. It can now obtain very little from Germany and much less

than before from the British Empire. The figures for the first ten months of 1939 show a steep rise in Japan's imports of American power-driven metal-working machinery, refined copper, and iron and steel scrap. Even in 1938 Japan obtained 56 per cent of its imported war materials from the United States, as against 21 per cent from the British Empire. In that year it bought in this country 90 per cent of its scrap iron and steel, 90 per cent of its aviation gasoline, 94 per cent of its automobiles, and large quantities of special steels and alloys, trucks, and lumber. The total value of its imports of American scrap, copper, and oil or gasoline came to nearly 100 million dollars.

Japan's trade position with respect to Russia is in no way comparable to Germany's. It may be a long time before Russia is in a position to supply Germany with much in the way of metals and oil, but it can even now substantially relieve the shortage of food and fodder. More important, Germany can sell to Russia precisely those things which Russia needs to increase its output of the materials Germany requires. It can supply Russia with machinery and technicians. Japan's most vital need, on the other hand, is not food but gasoline, iron, special steels, and machinery, of which Russia has barely enough for its own use. Russia certainly cannot supply Japan with these things if in addition to carrying on its war against Finland it is to help Germany.

Even if Russia, to serve the interests of a Germany to which it is by now fatally bound, could squeeze out some supplies of metal and oil for Japan, how could Japan pay? Those who speak glibly of the possibility of Japan's joining Russia and Germany, or of the futility of an embargo when Japan could obtain American supplies through other countries, seem to be ignorant of the nature of Japan's export trade. Its primary exports are raw silk, textiles (made of imported raw materials), canned fish and fruit, cheap manufactured articles such as toys, fancy goods, electric bulbs, bicycles, rubber goods, and knit wear, and pottery—all these being things which Russia either cannot afford to buy or makes for itself. Unlike Germany, Japan cannot supply Russia with machinery or construction goods, or with skilled workers and engineers; Japanese industry is itself suffering from an acute shortage of qualified personnel. Japan, in short, cannot supply Russia with what it needs any better than Russia could satisfy Japanese war requirements. Hence Japan's value as an ally would disappear if it were cut off from the American market. The alliance would, in fact, become

a liability rather than an asset to the totalitarian powers.


Germany would undoubtedly pay a high price to induce Japan to join with it against Britain and France, and Germany may soon be in a position to force Stalin to come to terms with Japan. Japan, for its part, would give a good deal to insure the cessation of Russian aid to China and the disruption of Chinese unity through the revival of class war by the Chinese Communists on orders from Moscow. But it is highly improbable that Japan could obtain these benefits without severing the hair by which the American sword of economic sanctions is suspended over its head. It would not serve the basic aims of the Japanese imperialists to have Chiang Kai-shek deprived of Russian arms if at the same time Japan itself were cut off from American war materials. And it would help Germany little to secure an already exhausted Japan as an ally against the British and French if Japan became a claimant for the scanty stocks of war materials held by Germany and Russia. In spite of American isolationism and in spite of the opinion voiced in some quarters that to save China means to pull British chestnuts out of the fire, it is hard to believe that the United States would continue to trade with a Japan which had allied itself with the Soviet Union and was partitioning China with the Communists to the exclusion of American trade.

If it is argued that a Russia which cannot supply Japan cannot furnish much aid to China, the answer is that China in this war depends on its great man-power and the endurance of its people, whereas Japan depends on

superior armaments. With a limited supply of arms the Chinese can keep up their resistance, but the Japanese can neither conquer China nor hold the territory they have occupied without large quantities of modern war materials.

It must be admitted that if Stalin deserted China, and the United States failed to give it material aid Chinese political and social unity might be destroyed, and the resistance to Japan broken. Should the Chinese Communists, upon instructions from the Comintern, proclaim Chiang Kai-shek to be the leader of Chinese White Guards and start fighting the Kuomintang government instead of the Japanese, China might once more sink into a state of anarchy or fall a prey to war lords. The Chinese Communist Party, however, is less subservient to Moscow than the artificially created Communist parties of Europe and America; it has in recent years enlisted in its ranks many prominent intellectuals, men primarily liberals and patriots; and it is rooted in a peasant movement in no sense Bolshevik in its aspirations. It is doubtful, therefore, whether a majority of its members would obey an order from Moscow to abandon the war of national liberation for a civil war against Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang.

The gravest danger to China, and to the future of the Far East, is the possibility that the U. S. S. R. may secure a predominant influence over the Chinese National Government. This might happen if the United States as well as Britain abandoned China for the purpose of warding



**JAPANESE BALANCING ACT.**

off the illusory menace of a Russo-Japanese alliance. Japan's threat to throw itself into the arms of Russia is as hollow as its threat to fight the United States. But China can with truth plead that if it is abandoned by the West it will have no alternatives except surrender to Japan and submission to Communist control. A China deprived of financial assistance from both Britain and the United States, and left to face a Japan armed by both, might find that it could only continue fighting at the cost of an agrarian revolution. If the Chinese peasants were given the land, the whole countryside could be counted upon to resist Japan as the Russian peasantry resisted the Allied intervention in 1920.

Since the Chinese Communists abandoned the class war in 1935, they have both advocated and practiced a policy of agrarian and governmental reform—not expropriation but rent reduction, not a Communist dictatorship but representative government. Nevertheless, account must be taken of the fact that the Comintern abandoned its democratic masquerade last August. Stalin would now have little to lose and might calculate that he had much to gain by ordering the Chinese Communists to revert to a revolutionary policy. China is one of the few countries where a revolutionary policy might succeed, and where the Communist Party is not too discredited to lead it. If Chiang Kai-shek decided to surrender to Japan rather than take a turn to the left so sharp as to lose him the support of the Chinese bankers, merchants, and landowners, we might see a mighty anarchic movement of the hungry and oppressed millions of China, compared with which the Kuomintang-Communist movement of 1924-27 would seem to have been but a breath of wind before the storm. Such a revolutionary movement, although it might not lead China to anything but disruption and misery, would engulf and destroy not only the Chinese possessing classes but also all foreign interests in China—American, European, and Japanese.

Japan so far has created only a "new disorder" in East Asia, but the forces of disruption have been held in check by the Kuomintang government, which is still striving to maintain China's ties with the democratic powers. The most progressive forces in the country, including not only the liberal intellectuals and the emerging middle class but also bankers of the type of T. V. Soong, hope for agrarian and administrative reforms and a democratic capitalist development with the aid of foreign loans and trade. If the United States at this juncture fails to take advantage of the situation to insure a free China and the Open Door—and at the same time the triumph of the moderate and progressive forces in Japan—China is more likely to fall a prey to bolshevism than to Japan. Now that the strain of war has begun to undermine Japanese unity and is giving the Japanese moderates a chance to assert themselves, it would be a trag-

edy if the United States were to relax the economic pressure which has already done so much to weaken the extremists.

Opponents of the embargo have argued that the Japanese army would lead Japan to commit hara-kiri as a nation rather than abandon the attempt to conquer China, that the Japanese would go to war with the United States over it even though they knew they would run short of essential war materials in a few weeks and had no hope of victory. This argument springs from an absurdly romantic view of the Japanese samurai, and ignores both the war-weary Japanese people and the big-business interests. The latter are by no means so powerless as is popularly supposed. Japan is not yet the fascist state that shortsighted friends of China have proclaimed it to be. The great monopoly business firms which control the economic life of Japan have not until now opposed the army, since they, no less than the military, desire the hegemony of China. Acquisition of a closed preserve for Japan in China was a policy from which all classes hoped to benefit as long as conquest seemed easy, and as long as the United States did not seriously oppose the "new order in East Asia." Today with an American embargo threatening, with no end to Chinese resistance in sight, with a financial crisis looming and a more colossal budget before the Diet than ever before, with the people murmuring at the shortage of rice, fish, and vegetables, at the charcoal famine, the coal shortage, with the shutting down of thousands of industrial enterprises for many days because of lack of power, the attitude of Japanese business men has changed. The "lean and hungry politicians," as the Japanese press terms them, have begun to raise their heads and to harass the government in the Diet.

If one realizes that the political parties in Japan are the spokesmen of big business in a literal sense unknown in the West, the action of Takao Saito on February 2 assumes especial significance. On that day this leading member of the Minseito Party threw a bombshell in the Diet by asking what Japan's war aims really are, and by suggesting that Japan should withdraw its army from China in order to make possible a negotiated peace. Ten days later Ryoza Makino of the Seiyukai Party demanded that the War Minister give a detailed account of army expenditures and spoke of the "uneasiness" of the people who, "debarred from making political criticism, are criticizing nevertheless." No one before has dared to oppose the war in China, or to question the huge military appropriations, and Mr. Saito and Mr. Makino would hardly have dared to do so if they had not been assured of the support of powerful interests.

The tone of the censored Japanese press warrants the assumption that the Japanese moderates perceive that their hour is at hand. The newspapers, like the people, have begun to ask, "When will this so-called long-term



construction of a new order in East Asia be ended?" The following passage from an article in the *Kokumin* in December is particularly outspoken but not different in substance from many other comments now appearing in the press:

There is a limit to the people's patience and endurance of hardship. The government should set up some goal which the people may determine to attain. The people cannot go on as they are indefinitely. Present conditions are like a long-distance race without any fixed goal. Even champions become exhausted in such a race. The nation will not be satisfied with a simple declaration that Japan does not want territories or indemnities but that the fighting will go on. The soldiers will be still more dissatisfied with such a declaration. Show us, say the people, the way and the goal.

Such articles as this could not be published in Japan if there were not powerful elements inside as well as outside the government favoring peace. The opportunity for gaining huge profits in foreign trade, now that Europe is involved in war, is an additional and potent motive impelling Japanese business interests to favor a peace with China which would release Japan's productive forces for the manufacture of export goods instead of armaments. But if the United States follows the British line of policy and "appeases" Japan, the moderates will be deprived of support and the extremists will regain their ascendancy.

## In the Wind

WHEN MRS. ROOSEVELT visited one of the sessions of the Youth Congress in Washington, she encountered a picket line of Young Republicans in front of the hall. One of her escorts asked her whether she minded walking past the pickets. "Of course not," she replied, "I only stop for labor picket lines."

LOOK IS RUNNING a picture-history of the present war edited by Laurence Stallings. A recent number showed a picture of a starving child with the caption: "German Child." In Laurence Stallings's book "The First World War" the same picture appears—to illustrate the "post-war famine in Russia."

NO WHITE HORSE? The French weekly *l'Europe Nouvelle* published an item recording the demolition of the Soviet pavilion at the New York World's Fair. A description of the architectural beauty of the pavilion contained a reference to "the high column surmounted by a gigantic figure of a nude woman holding a star aloft."

SHORTLY AFTER the British monarchs visited the United States, George Backer, publisher of the *New York Post*, was a dinner guest at the White House. The menu was unusually

elaborate, with caviar and similar dishes. When Backer seemed surprised, the President commented wryly: "Oh, this is just stuff that was left over after the party for the King and Queen."

SOCIETY NEWS: "The Regency Club, 15 East Sixty-seventh Street, a sumptuous playroom for the town's most affluent and spectacular bridge players, is planning a grand party tonight for Finnish relief. A polite and pleasant pandemonium is expected to reign in the plush quarters of the club tonight; and while it does not usually call out its members for 'causes,' Mrs. T. Charles Farrelly, vice-president, expressed the warm feeling the members had for the fighting Finns, adding, 'and we'd do anything for Mr. Hoover.'" —From the bridge column of the *New York Herald Tribune*.

FEMALE MEMBERS of the Communist Party have started wearing silk stockings again: party leaders decided that cotton made them too easy to identify. . . . In a recent *Saturday Review of Literature* poll one author was reported as favoring Mrs. Roosevelt for the Presidency; it was Rex Stout, the mystery writer. . . . A bitter row is raging on the Stanford University campus because the student council refused to sanction a Finnish relief program; Palo Alto, where the college is situated, is Herbert Hoover's home town, and Stanford his Alma Mater.

INTIMATES OF Morris Ernst were recalling his propensity to refer to celebrated people by their first names. Elmer Rice said he heard the neatest illustration of it at a Civil Liberties Union meeting some months ago. A member proposed that James Madison's birthday be linked to A. C. L. U. celebrations of the Bill of Rights; another protested that Madison's name wasn't meaningful enough to most Americans. Whereupon, reports Rice, Ernst protested excitedly: "Jim is damn well known."

IN THE LIST of instructions concerning the Youth Congress meeting, delegates were admonished to behave with "the utmost in decorum" when they met on the White House lawn. Apparently reading the last two words as one, they hissed on several occasions and applauded at the wrong places during the President's speech.

IN ITS MIDNIGHT edition on January 24 the *New York Times* carried a long account of a speech by Tom Dewey under the headline: "New Deal Means Ruin, Says Dewey." In the report of the address appeared two paragraphs hailing the Wagner Act as a "new liberty." It didn't sound like Mr. Dewey; it wasn't. The paragraphs had been transposed from another column quoting an address by J. Warren Madden.

ADVERTISEMENT in the *London Times*: "Sleeping partner required. Quick turn-over essential."

[We invite our readers to submit material for *In the Wind*—either clippings with source and date or stories that can be clearly authenticated. A prize of \$5 will be awarded each month for the best item.—EDITORS THE NATION.]

# Issues and Men

BY OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD

## The Facts About Mr. Dewey

THE effrontery of District Attorney Dewey's candidacy for the Presidency of the United States has amazed me since my return from Europe. Americans cannot project themselves into the situation in Europe; they do not realize that the demands upon European statesmen and upon those who head the United States government will be greater after this war is over than at any other time in modern history. That in this grave crisis the Republicans of the United States should be asked to vote for a man who is totally without experience in foreign affairs and has never held any administrative position except that of his present office and one other would be an amusing joke if its possible consequences were not so serious.

What are the facts about Mr. Dewey? So far as I can ascertain them they are the following: He is thirty-eight years old and has been a member of the bar for fourteen years. He has been chief assistant to the United States Attorney of the Southern District of New York and for a short time United States Attorney. He has been District Attorney of New York City since 1937 and was defeated for Governor of the state in 1938. He did not wish to accept the position of District Attorney when it was first offered to him, for he was not interested in that service to the public because of the smallness of the salary attached. Not wishing to support his family on \$10,000 a year, he had to be dragooned into taking the nomination. He promised, if elected, that he would serve out his term, and a year later accepted the nomination for Governor. On this extremely slim record of public service he is now contending for the nomination for President of the United States at a time when this country is confronting one of the gravest crises in its history.

Mr. Dewey has not distinguished himself at the New York bar. He has, however, made an excellent District Attorney and apparently has been a good administrator of the office. But he has been arrogant, very egotistical, and, if my information is correct, not popular with his own subordinates, for he seeks in every case all the praise for the achievements of his office. The newspapermen who come in contact with him in the main dislike him. He has been extremely high-handed in dealing with witnesses whom he has detained—under \$10,000 bail without charges against them—and placed, not in regular state institutions, but in houses specially hired for

the purpose, in one of which one of these witnesses committed suicide. Some of his acts along this line have been so censurable that representations have been made in Washington by those who are on the lookout to protect the public from breaches of the Bill of Rights and infringements of civil liberties. In talking recently with a high judge, a Republican, and with one of the foremost members of the New York bar, an independent Democrat, I found that both of them were emphatically of the opinion that even from the lawyer's point of view Dewey lacks the background to make him worthy of serious consideration for the great office to which he now aspires—he certainly seeks the office, and not the office the man. There is no comparison between his career and the early career of Charles E. Hughes, for whose nomination as Governor there was a widespread demand as a result of his services as counsel in the special inquiry into the maladministration of the insurance companies in New York City.

As for Mr. Dewey's speeches, which constitute his bid for the office, they show that he is hastily acquiring opinions upon all sorts of matters; it is reported that there is a brain trust which is carefully coaching him on what he shall say and think, notably on foreign issues. Already he has come out for the extreme big-navy position—navies in both oceans—without, I am willing to wager, ever having considered the arguments on the other side. He is trying to straddle on the New Deal in that, like so many other Republicans, he does not denounce it altogether but wants to keep part of it while opposing its manners and methods. He has as yet worked out no alternative program which is worth considering. That he is being put forward seriously merely testifies to the absolute lack of leadership in the Republican Party. It is true that he makes agreeable, at times skilful, speeches, that he has a fine speaking voice and therefore makes a good appeal on the radio, that he is personally attractive. None of these things warrant the assumption that at thirty-eight he is competent to administer the affairs of the United States in the middle of a war the gravity of which cannot be too much stressed. So far as his record is concerned, there are thousands of other Americans who are just as much entitled to consideration. I for one refuse to believe that he can possibly be put over in the Republican convention. He will not be if those who have come in contact with him in his work in New York say what they really think about him.

# BOOKS and the ARTS

## Notes by the Way

WHAT one remembers most vividly, at first, about Erskine Caldwell's new book, "Trouble in July" (Duell, Sloane, and Pearce, \$2.50), is the sultry, oppressive atmosphere of the Georgia cotton country in summer. Then one realizes that the oppressive element is not a natural but a human one—the tension between blacks and whites and above all the white man's compulsion to cling, in his poverty of body and spirit, to his one remaining value, superiority over the Negro.

The story is a simple one; it is also one which has been enacted so often in real life in the South that it has taken on the quality of a sinister folk tale. A "poor white" girl in the Georgia setting Mr. Caldwell knows and has described so thoroughly in the past asserts that she has been raped by a young Negro. The boy is driven away by his own people out of fear and goes into hiding. Meanwhile the hunt begins; and as it runs its course to its predestined fatal end Mr. Caldwell gives us a picture which conveys better than anything else I have read the quality of a community obsessed and held in bondage by race prejudice. In at least two of the characters there is a conflict of feeling and will—with the will operating on the side of prejudice. It is one of these two who finally turns the boy over to his lynchers, though he is convinced of his innocence, in order to preserve his own status as a white man. After the lynching the girl reveals what everyone really knew, that there had been no rape, and is herself stoned by the mob. By that time it is clear that the hunt and the kill and race prejudice itself are expressions of impulses rooted deep in the human and social complex of the time and place. And the whole episode seems to float in the shimmering dusty heat as in some colorless preservative jelly.

Mr. Caldwell has always worked to a small scale. Many of his short stories are little more than anecdotes that seem hardly to justify formal publication; the present "novel" deals with one incident. Heretofore his most striking characters, being "submarginal," have been interesting not as human individuals but as biological types so low in the scale that their behavior arouses laughter that has always seemed to me half-defensive—to cover a recoil from the idea that these creatures are really fellow human beings. But his technical skill and his unsentimental approach to his material have given his stories an intrinsic interest as writing. In the present book the humor and the merciless objectivity of "Tobacco Road" remain. But the compassion and understanding which have shown through in his best shorter pieces are given fuller expression than in any of his previous work. And the fact that they are not baldly obtruded but woven into the fabric of the story is all the more decisive evidence of his growth as a writer and as an understanding observer of social processes. As a result, even the crudest characters in this book take on humanity, and though Mr. Caldwell has

made no compromise with sentimentality—with one exception—he has given us human beings in a tragic situation rather than outlandish figures in a folk tale. The one exception is the characterization of Sonny, the Negro boy, which lacks the shading that gives reality to his persecutors. This defect, however, is less serious in relation to the plot than might be expected, for the reader's certainty of Sonny's innocence rests on Mr. Caldwell's convincing picture of him as young and scared in a white man's world rather than as a good boy.

"Trouble in July" illustrates once more that the first requirement for writing good fiction of "social significance" is the ability to write good fiction. This simple truth bears restating at a time when formless tracts are called novels, when static symbolic figures, in abject slavery to their authors, pass for characters, and when atmosphere, instead of being built into the structure of a given work, is largely achieved by means of a kind of literary demagoguery with which the author exploits simple and known responses of the reading populace. This type of evocative writing may be socially useful—witness "The Grapes of Wrath." But the fact that such works are dependent for their main force on external rather than internal elements lessens their chances of standing by themselves in a different public climate—and that is still the test of a work of art. I should not hazard the prediction that "Trouble in July" will live forever; I am merely asserting that being self-sufficient—in form, character, atmosphere, and suspense—it has a life of its own. And art is one field in which autarchy is necessary for survival.

MARGARET MARSHALL

## An Epilogue to Peace

PROLOGUE TO WAR. By Elizabeth Wiskemann. Oxford University Press. \$3.

WHEN Lord Runciman embarked upon his sinister trip to Prague, a pictorial published a picture of him sitting in a railway compartment reading Miss Wiskemann's "Germans and Czechs." From what happened later we may infer that his journey was too short to allow him to finish this scholarly work; otherwise, perhaps, he would not so readily have assisted at the dismemberment of Europe's only post-war-created democracy, of which, as Mr. Chamberlain confessed, he and his colleagues knew so little. When Miss Wiskemann's new book appeared on the eve of the current war, it was too late for any study of it to avert the catastrophe, but no statesman who may be responsible for the future peace can afford to neglect it, lest the peace should be indeed no peace but merely a prologue to another war.

Bismarck is supposed to have said that there were only two people in Europe who understood the Balkans—himself and another statesman who went mad and, unfortunately, died. Miss Wiskemann, fortunately, is very much alive, and though I am loath to indulge in the Balkan habit of super-



lative, her book reveals the most stupendous knowledge of the turmoil in all those countries east and west of the axis upon which Nazi imperialism is anxious to bestow its benefits. She presents a vivid picture of the political and economic pressure exerted by Germany upon the countries in its potential *Lebensraum*, and at the same time gives the clearest possible explanation of the conflicting national ambitions and economic interests in Eastern and Southeastern Europe.

No one has mastered the political and economic entanglements of these countries, with all their party antagonisms, intrigues, and personal ramifications, better than Miss Wiskemann. Not only was she there, "on the spot," as journalists used to be, but she really knows the spot, its history and all its problems, as correspondents do not always know it. This virtue of hers is responsible for her only sin. When, after the World War, society in all countries west of the Rhine and south of the Alps turned topsy-turvy, the upheaval brought adventurers, criminals, nobodies, and, as the Nazi example shows, even monsters to the political surface. Miss Wiskemann's knowledge of these new politicians is not only astonishing but, to the less erudite reader, even bewildering. In spite of her brilliant style, which makes all the details delightful reading, we sometimes wish that she would give us fewer facts and a more compact synopsis of the social background. Considering the ignorance of Western Europe and the United States about the Balkan mentality, it would have been illuminating if she had summarized for us that Eastern mind clad in Western garb for which falseness, deceitfulness, and trickery are natural ways and means to an end.

There could be no more convincing evidence of the keenness of Miss Wiskemann's political judgment than the unaltered publication in September, 1939, of a book finished in July, 1938. No politician who reads this book will have any excuse for believing it possible to come to terms with highwaymen whose craving for world domination implies the destruction of the most valuable achievements of Christian civilization. Certainly no one should feel entitled to express an opinion about the issues of the war without having read its prologue, which harmoniously combines the full command of all relevant facts with a keen understanding.

RUSTEM VAMBERY

## The Mexico of Cárdenas

*THE RECONQUEST OF MEXICO.* By Nathaniel and Sylvia Weyl. The Oxford University Press. \$3.

THE project of this book is ambitious: to combine a biography of President Lázaro Cárdenas and an examination of the sometimes spectacular events of his administration with a retrospective view of the Mexican Revolution. The result is not, unhappily, uniformly successful. In an attempt, apparently, to avoid retracing ground already surveyed by previous commentators, the Weyls present their reading of the revolution in terms of the childhood and youth of their protagonist. But the subject of the revolutionary origins and development has by no means been exhausted; on the contrary, it is literally impossible to under-

stand why the Cárdenas government has been unique without a thorough analysis of the pre-Cárdenas period and of the peculiar configuration of historical forces which has permitted its extraordinary experimentation. This the Weyls have failed adequately to provide. Owing perhaps to the divided attention implicit in their approach, their treatment of the revolution is superficial and spotty, and is further marred by hasty and unwarranted judgments, such as their underestimation of Venustiano Carranza, without whom the entire revolutionary movement must inevitably have degenerated into a sterile anarchy leading to nothing but a restoration of the Porfirio Díaz feudalism.

The Weyls are on firmer ground in their discussion of contemporary problems. Their chapters on the agrarian reform, the oil controversy, the nationalization of the railroads, the growing power of the labor movement and its struggles with native and foreign industry, and on education, hygiene, and social welfare are an admirably clear exposition of the policies and accomplishments of the past five years, buttressed by a good deal of valuable statistical and other data which are not readily available to the casual inquirer into Mexican affairs.

The authors see the Cárdenas government as a transition regime between a hybrid capitalism and some form of the cooperative commonwealth, and they find Cárdenas himself the ablest exponent of an emerging Mexican democracy. It is true, of course, that the present administration has made immense strides toward the goal of preparing the Mexican masses for an enlarged degree of participation in political and economic affairs and has shown remarkable invention and imagination in devising new forms by which to canalize the growing political demands of an awakening but still semi-illiterate and half-starved people.

It would be dangerous, nevertheless, to confuse the forms with the underlying reality. Liberal capitalism, as the term is understood in the great industrial countries, has never existed in Mexico, where its struggles to develop have been frustrated by well-defined alien distortions of the national economy. Too weak economically and too timid politically to reap the full harvest of its own revolution, the middle class has lost direct political control of the country to the workers and peasants who are Cárdenas's chief supporters. But despite the growth of public ownership of industry and of collective agriculture in certain regions, Mexico's economy is still preponderantly "feudo-capitalist," with imperialist overtones, while the efforts of the government in behalf of the working classes—that is, its measures to promote literacy, health, and mass purchasing power—are coming ever closer to the dilemma that confronts all liberal regimes: if on the one hand they are building a wider base for the capitalist market, they simultaneously hold back industrial expansion by diverting a limited surplus into social services. This route is progressive, and extremely beneficial to the great majority of the Mexican people, but it does not of itself lead to socialism. What it does lead to immediately is political crisis, as in the current presidential campaign, in which a resentful middle class is preparing, either by violent counter-revolution or by seduction or intimidation of his successor, to bury the policies of the hated Cárdenas regime under a reactionary avalanche.

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The Weyls have tackled an extremely difficult task in their endeavor to provide a handbook to the puzzling Cárdenas government, and except for some more or less serious errors—space is lacking to deal with them all in detail—their study is a generally reliable guide. It presents objectively and with considerable insight the essential facts in most of the recent matters of controversy; it is thus an excellent antidote to such "smear-Mexico" propaganda as that currently emanating from oil-company and other interested quarters.

HARRY BLOCK

## Politics and Progress

*THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS: 1919-1939. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.* By Edward Hallet Carr. The Macmillan Company. \$3.

FORMERLY an official of the British Foreign Office and now a university professor, Mr. Carr, in a book of this title, might be expected to resurvey the history of the past twenty years and to expatiate on the blunders which, in his opinion, were the chief architects of recent moral and material ruin. The crisis which he discusses, however, is a crisis of thought. We have had two decades of muddled thinking. "Politics," he declares, "are made up of two elements—utopia and reality—belonging to two different planes which can never meet. There is no greater barrier to clear political thinking than failure to distinguish between ideals which are utopia and institutions which are reality."

The "utopians" have not seen that morality and power have their connections. This is Mr. Carr's argument, and it is greatly influenced by Bertrand Russell's excellent book entitled "Power." We have had too much morality which ignored power—the League; and too much power without morality—Bolshevism and National Socialism. Mr. Carr sets for himself the task of bringing "down the whole cardboard structure of post-war utopian thought by exposing the hollowness of the material out of which it is built." After he has diagnosed and described the disease, he proposes not a surgical operation but only a dose of salts—that is, clearer thinking; and he himself says that the directions toward which he would push the thinking are "utopian."

Writing smoothly and clearly, widely read in political theory, and with a gift for apt quotation, Mr. Carr devotes much of his book to catching the "utopians"—Sir Alfred Zimmern or Professor Toynbee, for example—in mental undress and demonstrating that their negligee is careless. He is more interested in silly things that utopians may have said than in what statesmen have done and whether they could have persuaded their peoples to support them in doing otherwise. The result is a series of straw men set up and triumphantly knocked down. When he cannot find a personal straw man he creates an impersonal one: "some utopians," "a commonly held view," and the like.

In his final chapter Mr. Carr fuses some of his dialectical points into an analysis which is persuasive and in some respects fresh. He asks whether the satisfied powers which identified international morality "with security, law and order, and other time-honored slogans of privileged groups"

do not divide responsibility for recent disasters with the dissatisfied powers which "practically denied the validity of an international morality so constituted." He draws an interesting analogy between intra-state developments with particular reference to the position of labor organizations. A century ago self-help by labor was illegal. Now, although the right to strike is conceded everywhere save in the totalitarian states, the vast majority of labor disputes are adjusted through various forms of conciliation or arbitration. There is almost a regular system of "peaceful change," the costs of which to employers and the possessors of property are constantly mounting. They pay the higher costs, albeit reluctantly, and thereby maintain their position as employers and owners. The parallel cannot be pressed too far, but Mr. Carr argues that a realistic view of a possible new international order must recognize the necessity of making less irrepressible the conflict between privileged and underprivileged in the international sphere. The difficulty is an unwillingness to accept the truth that "conflict between nations, like the conflict between classes, can only be resolved by sacrifice."

So, Mr. Carr concludes, "all states are being compelled to subordinate economic advantage to social ends," and he thinks that the more "the provision of a rational employment supplants maximum profit as an aim of economic policy," the more inclined states will be to see that their social ends are not limited by frontiers. After the last war they recognized this to an extent in granting "relief credits." Loans from which there can be no adequate economic or even military return are now considered sound statecraft. If we further broaden our view of national policy this may help "to broaden our view of international policy." Mr. Carr admits that "this, too, is a utopia," and his readers will agree. But some may be comforted if they recall that, in discussing a league to enforce peace—this was before the drafting of the Covenant—Senator Henry Cabot Lodge declared that it is only by striving for utopias that any real progress can be made.

LINDSAY ROGERS

## Cross-Section

*BOOKS THAT CHANGED OUR MINDS.* Edited by Malcolm Cowley and Bernard Smith. Doubleday, Doran and Company. \$2.50.

THIS symposium is the result of an inquiry addressed to a number of representative men by the editors of the *New Republic* as to the books published in the twentieth century which have influenced them fundamentally. The final list, with the writers who have contributed the evaluations, is: Freud and "The Interpretation of Dreams," by George Soule; "The Education of Henry Adams," by Louis Kronenberger; Turner's "The Frontier in American History," by Charles A. Beard; Sumner's "Folkways," by John Chamberlain; Veblen and "Business Enterprise," by R. G. Tugwell; Dewey and his "Studies in Logical Theory," by C. E. Ayres; Boas and "The Mind of Primitive Man," by Paul Radin; Beard's "Economic Interpretation of the Constitution," by Max Lerner; Richards's "The Principles of Literary Criticism," by David Daiches; Parrington's "Main Currents in

American Thought," by Bernard Smith; Lenin's "The State and Revolution," by Max Lerner; Spengler's "The Decline of the West," by Lewis Mumford.

The choice was heavily weighted in advance: first, by excluding all works of fiction, in a time which has been strongly affected by at least two writers of fiction, Marcel Proust and James Joyce, and perhaps a third, the Sinclair Lewis of "Main Street" and "Babbitt"; second, by what Mr. Cowley, in an Afterword on the Modern Mind, which, with his Foreword giving book lists submitted, goes far to redress the balance and disarm criticism, calls "the political temper of its editors and their advisers." "Most of these are progressives," he explains, "in the sense that they believe in democratic control and in the possibility of social progress."

Most of us are progressives in this sense; but the scales are further weighted by the predominance of one particular progressive preoccupation. The exposition of the principle of economic determinism—which all of us whose minds have been "changed" by the twentieth century believe in—is given, through accidents of treatment as well as choice, a preponderance which, in the light of the total omission of literary and scientific works, is almost exclusive. ("The Principles of Literary Criticism," though an important book for students of literature, belongs more in the realm of philosophy and psychology.)

I cannot believe Spengler's "The Decline of the West," however stimulating in detail, changed many progressive minds; nor does Mr. Mumford's beautifully written essay argue very strongly for it. Its inclusion seems to result from a tendency which we share with the Germans: on the one hand, to be impressed by writers who wear their learning heavy with multiplied detail, and, obversely, to be almost ruthlessly preoccupied with one phase of truth (to use a dangerously convenient word) at a time.

In practice it means, at best, a preoccupation with passing phases of the American scene, at worst, the extension of the best-seller system to the world of ideas. Mr. Cowley, using some well-selected passages from Mill as a foil, shows cogently how "the history of thought for the last eighty years might be centered round the attack on the Reasoning Man." Of the eight American writers considered, only Dewey and Boas have played fundamental parts in this attack, and neither of them is quite comparable to Freud—or to Lenin, who leads the attack on another front. Naturally, not all the books which have changed our minds are of the same order of theoretical importance. Yet it is noteworthy that so large a proportion of those which demanded a place in this cross-section of the mind of the American intellectual should be expressions of purely American—and in all but two cases, passing—aspects of "truth." This is a comment and not a criticism. It is even more remarkable that the attack on the Reasoning Man on the biological and cosmological fronts should be unrepresented in an age which has seen a revolutionary break-up of traditional concepts.

But where everyone differs no one can be dogmatic, nor have the editors fallen into this error. Not the least valuable and enlightening feature is Mr. Cowley's humane and reasonable summing up. Which may go to show that the attack on the Reasoning Man has only resulted in more careful reasoning.

JAMES ORRICK

## Small-Town Exile

*THE MORNING IS NEAR US.* By Susan Glaspell. Frederick A. Stokes Company. \$2.50.

AS IN her Pulitzer Prize play, "Alison's House," Susan Glaspell again depicts the unraveling of a dead woman's secret, which certain members of her family have assiduously kept shrouded in order to protect her memory. But instead of a literary personage as the vehicle for the mystery, we have a very beautiful woman who married, under unusual and disturbing circumstances, into a middle-class family in a small American town. The focal character is her daughter, Lydia Chippman, who was sent away from home while barely in her teens, and who for twenty-five years has wandered restlessly over the world, hating her nomadic existence, but always finding obstacles placed by her relatives in the way of her returning home. When she does come back she sets herself to ferret out the reasons for her protracted exile, for the ambiguous terms on which she is allowed to take possession of the old family home, and for the mystery surrounding her mother's past, but at every turn she runs into more blind alleys, more admonishments to relinquish the quest. A large share of her puzzlement results not so much from lack of clues as from Lydia's thorough guilelessness and innocence of spirit—she has even adopted two children, one Greek and one Mexican, to say nothing of a sweet-tempered donkey, yet she cannot understand why the townspeople consider her queer. Long before Lydia discovers it, the reader will have guessed that she is an illegitimate child, and guessing that, may feel that the author makes a world of pother and delay in getting to the dénouement; but the explanation turns out to be not quite so simple, involving a tortuous psychological labyrinth in the relations between Lydia's mother and father, the final clarification of which is reserved for a melodramatic reconciliation scene, with appropriate obligato of night and rainstorm. Except for this unnecessarily shrill climax, however, the book preserves a tone of quiet sympathy and searching analysis entirely worthy of Miss Glaspell's competent hand.

LOUIS B. SALOMON

## Shorter Notices

*ARETINO, SCOURGE OF PRINCES.* By Thomas Caldecot Chubb. Reynal and Hitchcock. \$3.50.

A life of the Cinquecento shoemaker's son, called by Milton "the ribald of Arezzo," who raised libel and pornography to the rank of literature and blackmail to the status of a career. Associated with three popes, Henry VIII, François I, and several lesser notables, he was finally bought off by Charles V himself. Mr. Chubb, author of "The Life of Giovanni Boccaccio," knows a great deal about the Italian Renaissance, but he seems occasionally to supply details from memory and always writes in the style of a mail-order advertisement. This does not prevent the book from being interesting.

*WHY BRITAIN IS AT WAR.* By Harold Nicolson. Penguin Books. 25 cents.

"The answer to that question can be given in two words, 'Adolf Hitler,'" says Mr. Nicolson, but an additional reason



emerges—the extreme gullibility of the British government. He explains to his readers that the ordinary Britisher's instinct for self-preservation and moral sense have been outraged, and offers good advice on war aims and peace conferences. There is no mention of India.

**THE CASE FOR FEDERAL UNION.** By W. B. Curry. Penguin Books. 25 cents.

A convincing demonstration of the necessity of world order and the desirability of a federal order. The book leans heavily on "Union Now," by Clarence Streit, who contributes the American preface. It was largely written before last September, and the author's afterthoughts fail to dispose of the now obvious objections to Mr. Streit's plan of beginning with a few selected "democracies." Nor is adequate consideration given to the desirability of federating on geographical lines first if only a partial beginning is feasible. The British Empire renders a United States of Europe so difficult that it would seem to be world federation or none.

**THE ART AND LIFE OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE.** By Hazelton Spencer. Harcourt, Brace and Company. \$3.

All the known facts, together with a compendium of criticism, interpretation, and stage history which represents a remarkable job of sifting. Copious, beautiful, and informative illustrations, notes that interest and enlighten, and a select critical bibliography that is an excellent guide to further study make this a book which any student of Shakespeare will find interesting and useful. The only defect is that the author sometimes overemphasizes common sense at the expense of more interpretative and speculative writers.

**THE EMPEROR CHARLES V: THE GROWTH AND DESTINY OF A MAN AND OF A WORLD-EMPIRE.** By Karl Brandi. Translated from the German by C. V. Wedgwood. Alfred A. Knopf. \$5.

This biography of the remarkable man who directly or indirectly ruled most of the sixteenth-century world from Poland to Peru, and of all the Holy Roman Emperors since Charlemagne came nearest to achieving their common goal, combines a history of the times with an interpretation of the inner development of a human being. It is not only scholarly—the author is the greatest living authority on this ramified subject—but readable, and the translation is of the smoothest.

## Drama Note

SO FAR only two new plays have disturbed the tranquility of Lent, and neither will be long remembered. Bernard Shaw's "Geneva" was perhaps not quite so dull as one had been led to expect, but there is no reason for deeply regretting its quick disappearance. It was a rather bald mixture of farce and argument whose only conclusion was perfectly familiar to readers of Shaw: as a political animal man is a complete failure. Few would care to dispute that statement, but the implied corollary is not particularly helpful. We can't wait for the superman.

"The Unconquered" (Biltmore Theater) is Ayn Rand's own dramatization of her novel "We the Living." It is a mixture of melodrama and farce purporting to show what happens to personal integrity under the Soviet regime. It is heavy-handed and neither more nor less interesting than most of the plays defending what the present author attacks.

JOSEPH WOOD KRUTCH

# ART

## The Sleeping Renaissance

EXCUSES have come from the directors of the Museum of Modern Art for its exhibition, now current, of the group of paintings and sculptures of the Renaissance and the Baroque period lent by the Italian government to the San Francisco Fair—the group which includes such marvels as Michelangelo's Madonna Pitti, The Birth of Venus by Botticelli, Verrocchio's David, and Titian's Paul III. Defensively the catalogue stresses the appropriateness, to a modern museum, of this show of old masterpieces, insisting that three great traditions of European art have their sources in the art represented: the Venetian tradition of rich color and dynamic motion, the Florentine tradition of classic line and static sculptural forms influenced by antiquity, and the Bolognese tradition of optical realism, realistic subject matter, and analysis of light. Almost defiantly it points to the fact that not only the opulent Titian and the jewel-like Giovanni Bellini now on the museum walls but their neighbor, the delicately coloristic St. George by Mantegna, are connected through Rubens and Delacroix with the painting of Renoir. A straight line, again it affirms, leads from another of the marvelous exhibits, Masaccio's powerful, tactile little Crucifixion, and from the elegantly composed Madonna of the Chair by Raphael—hanging close by—through Poussin and Ingres to the art of Degas and Seurat. As for the Boy Bitten by a Lizard, the sensational Caravaggio prominent in the Baroque section—that, or at least the experiments in violent lighting represented by it, the catalogue avers, helped engender Velasquez and Goya, who helped engender Manet and the impressionists.

Possibly all these claims are just. But such excuses on the part of an institution dedicated to the appreciation of modern art and the illumination of contemporary life were unnecessary. The show, which is effectively, reverently, magnificently spaced and lighted, constitutes a standard of comparison favorable in particular to the judgment of modern art and to a knowledge of our time. The relative freedom of the great modern masters grows distinct as one stands in the midst of it. The old masters, one perceives, were more constrained by conventions than were their recent successors, not only in their choice of subjects but in their techniques and means of solving problems. The relatively more complete aestheticism of the modern masterpieces also grows plain: their greater independence of subject matter for their interest. Simultaneously the exhibition makes evident the degree to which we, who but recently considered ourselves heirs to

the Renaissance, have become alienated from its world and spirit.

Among these works one suddenly finds oneself in a world of strangely self-confident creatures, of surprisingly energetic, able individuals who delighted in their personalities, knowing they contained the seeds of universal life, mastered a vast circle of spiritual interests, and aspired to universality; who felt about them, with intoxication, the magic breath of the cosmos. As in a dream, bit by bit, all this becomes clear to us from its expressions, in themselves so curiously philosophical. We recover the intense appreciation of personality and of the beauty of wholeness of soul and body from the serene Donatello portrait-bust; the deification of manhood from the tragic and virile figure of the Christ by Masaccio; the pride, the purposefulness, the self-reliance from the nervous and individualized form of Verrocchio's sinewy little David. In the wavy, gentle lines of the Botticelli reverberates a hymn to the spirit of the blowing earth. Out of the broadly conceived and architectonic Michelangelo low-relief surges a presentiment of the coming god-man, the co-Creator. The unfailing social rhythm not only of the Venetian art but of all the work, the harmony of the feelings objectified in it, and the simplicity of the objectification overwhelmingly bring this strange world home. One grasps that for these artists and the culture they embodied divinity was latent in the whole nature of man. Pico della Mirandola, indeed, spoke for them all in saying, "To us it has been given to turn ourselves of our free will into godlike beings!"

The feeling of remoteness persists. This vernal world of amazing, immense individuals moved to multilateral self-development and still in harmony with nature and society, this world above all of the reborn "Promethean" thought, seems lost in some past of the human being. Is it possible, one wonders, that the abuse of machinery has permanently impaired delight in personality, the sense of the individual's sanctity, and his impulse to self-development?

That thought, however, the exhibition refuses to corroborate. The expression of the consciousness of a great opportunity missed, of disappointed ambition and smothering materialism in Titian's melancholy Paul III; the vision of the ruined, pestilence-smitten Italy of the puritanical Counter-Reformation evoked by Tintoretto's furious, dynamic proclamation of the unity of the spiritual and material realms in St. Augustine Healing the Plague-Stricken, suddenly remind

us that even in the sixteenth century the spirit of the rebirth must have seemed frustrated. We know its death was deceptive. Never the possession merely of an élite, the self-confidence of the Renaissance awoke in other lands. Periodically it has died and then resumed: men whom the race has accepted as representative, men close to ourselves, have been moved to universality—Goethe, for example. The "Promethean" thought lives in Beethoven's music and in the poetry of Whitman. We are in one of the periods of seeming death.

PAUL ROSENFELD

## RECORDS

A READER in Arkansas A. and M. College writes to call my attention to "the fact that not one major radio station in the whole South carries the Saturday evening N.B.C. Symphony broadcasts"; and that since the stations which the *Radio Guide* lists for the C.S.T. belt cannot be satisfactorily heard there, "all we have now is Mr. Barbirolli and his constant repetitions of those damned Enigma Variations!" But there are other parts of the South, I was once told, which don't get even that. "Letters to individual radio stations," my correspondent goes on, "bring the reply that the N.B.C. chain selects the stations which will carry the concerts; and the N.B.C. office writes that it is left to individual stations to decide if they will broadcast the concerts. Someone is certainly prevaricating." He feels that "until N.B.C. does something to remedy this situation it should pull in its proud chest and cease this blabbering about the wonderful service it is rendering the cause of good music in America." And his concluding sentence is: "Mr. Olin Downes was too timorous of stepping on somebody's toes to print a letter in the *New York Times*."

Dorothy Maynor's singing of Handel's "O Sleep! Why Dost Thou Leave Me?" on her second Victor record (15826, \$2) is very beautiful, but not as extraordinary as what she accomplished with the piece at her New York debut; and the voice is not as faithfully reproduced as it is in "Ach, ich fühl's" from "The Magic Flute" on the reverse side. There one hears the loveliness of timbre and good taste in phrasing, but also the absence, as yet, of anything that could be called style—the style, for example, which contributes as much as the sheer beauty of Milizia Korjus's voice to making her record of arias from Verdi's "Ernani" and "I Vespri Siciliani" (12603, \$1.50) outstanding. Expert listeners note another important difference—that the beauty of Korjus's voice rests on a secure foundation of thorough schooling, and the loveliness of Miss Maynor's does not. And the importance of this difference is that a beautiful voice which is well schooled retains its beauty, whereas one that is not well schooled loses it. These people feel that Miss Maynor has been pushed out on the concert platform before she is ready and may suffer for it.

Kipnis sings Schubert's "Erlkönig" on his new Victor record (15825, \$2) with more dramatic point than on his older Columbia record, but with less beauty of voice. On the

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reverse side is Schumann's "Two Grenadiers," excellently done. Melchior's voice in its best present-day condition and the superb sound of the Philadelphia Orchestra under Ormandy are faithfully reproduced on the record (2035, \$1.50) of Siegmund's Spring Song from "Die Walküre" and Siegfried's Forge Song from "Siegfried." As for Igor Gorin's set of Mussorgsky's songs (M-636, \$6.50), it offers Rimsky-Korsakov's objectionable modifications of the Mussorgsky originals, sung agreeably but wholly without significant phrasing, and in Russian that is lacerating to Russian ears.

Continuing its Beethoven series the Coolidge Quartet has recorded a polished performance of Beethoven's Opus 18 No. 2 (M-622, \$4), a work which I find uninteresting. Some of the music of "Façade" that Walton has recorded with the London Philharmonic (12532, \$1.50) is amusing; but in other parts the humor is not apparent without the text. Hindemith's Sonata for piano four hands, recorded by Sanroma and the composer (M-637, \$4), one can neglect.

The Soviet Russian records that were sold at the World's Fair and are now being sold by Stinson Trading Company offer good recording and surfaces. The few that I have heard include a coupling of "Kalinka" (7696) and "In the Moonlit Meadows" (6228), both superbly sung by a Red Army group; a coupling of two Ukrainian folksongs, "Gretchanyki" (5215) and "Vzyav by ya Banduru" (5199), as superbly sung by Patorzhinsky and a Ukrainian ensemble; an interesting excerpt from the Armenian opera "Anush" (6691/2), in which an authentically Armenian vocal style is heard over a modern European orchestral accompaniment that is well contrived and effective, though not with the effect that an Armenian accompaniment would produce. Interested in the singing that is to be heard in Russian opera houses I picked at random the coupling of two arias from "Faust" (5958/9) sung by Pirogov, formerly one of the greatest artists in Russia, who turns out to have now only the wobbly remains of a voice. And a coupling of Lykov's aria from "The Tsar's Bride" sung by Sereda (5746) and the Gypsy's Song from "Aleko" sung by Khromtchenko (4598) discloses that in Russia, too, young singers may be pushed out on the stage with insufficiently schooled voices. The reasons are different, but not the results.

What should be Columbia's outstanding February release, the Prelude to Act 3 of "Tristan und Isolde" recorded by Weingartner, has not yet arrived. The rest of Columbia's list offers nothing to get excited over: a performance of the Chicago Symphony under Stock which gives us the letter of Tchaikovsky's "Nutcracker" Suite, and the letter clouded by reverberant recording (M-395, \$5); six English folk dances arranged by Arnold Foster and recorded by his Folk Dance Octet (M-394, \$3.50)—charming tunes, but repeated too many times and in too elaborate arrangements; Fauré's Theme and Variations Opus 73 for piano (X-156, \$3.50), which says very little very fluently and is well played by Carmen Guilbert and excellently recorded; a dull Geminiani sonata for violin (X-155, \$3.50) played by sixteen-year-old Arnold Belnick with good musical taste but with a tone that, on these records, sounds wiry; and Strauss's "Zueignung" and "Allerseelen" (17185-D, \$1), luridly sung and played by Nelson Eddy and an orchestra under Nathaniel Finston.

B. B. HAGGIN

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## Letters to the Editors

### No Adjournment of the War!

*Dear Sirs:* I know Oswald Garrison Villard too well not to know that he has no desire or intention to play into Hitler's hands, but his proposal in *The Nation* of January 27 that an attempt should be made to bring the Allies and Hitler together would, I fear, do just that.

Mr. Villard says that considerable elements in both the German Army and the German Foreign Office would like peace negotiations. I have no doubt that he is right. Indeed, I would go farther and say that, in all probability, most of the German military and civil authorities, including Hitler himself, would like them. The methods of German propaganda suggest this. The aim seems to be, on the one hand, to terrify us into negotiating by threatening various forms of frightfulness and certain defeat, and on the other hand to persuade us that if we do not make peace we shall have communism in Germany. Mr. Villard says that "undoubtedly" many German military men and a great many civilian officials believe that Germany will win easily next spring. Undoubtedly they say so, but I doubt very much whether they really believe it. It is more probable that this is part of the propaganda.

In general I fear that Mr. Villard has taken too much for granted the sincerity of the remarks that were made to him in Germany. When I was in Berlin in 1933 perfect strangers sometimes talked to me in much the same way, and some of them even called on me to do it. Many of my friends had the same experience. We never doubted that such persons were acting under instructions. I cannot believe that there are as many people in Germany willing to risk a concentration camp or worse as Mr. Villard's experience would suggest.

The question what terms Hitler might or might not be willing to discuss seems to me futile. It is incredible to me that anybody could suppose, after all our experience in the past, that Hitler's signature to any peace treaty would be of the smallest value. He is perhaps capable of pretending to retire for the purpose of allowing other people to sign the treaty and then returning to office to break it. Whatever the immediate result of peace negotiations might be, they would

merely adjourn the war—not end it.

The war aim of the Allies has been stated again and again. It is to destroy the present German regime as the first step toward ridding Europe of the German menace. All the foreigners living in Germany that I know agree that nothing will do this but the defeat of Germany in war. I agree with Mr. Villard that defeat in itself will not cleanse Germany of Hitlerism and National Socialism—they are too deeply rooted in the German subconsciousness—but we cannot do everything at once.

ROBERT DELL

Washington, February 13

### German Refugees in France

*Dear Sirs:* In a letter which appeared in *The Nation* on December 16 Gustav Richter complained of the treatment of anti-Nazi refugees in France. While the lot of refugees in France is not a happy one, it is necessary to guard against creating the impression that France is wilfully mistreating them. There is evidence that the French government has taken action to rectify some of the conditions which Mr. Richter discussed.

When war broke out, France was obliged to intern all aliens from enemy countries (Poles and Czechoslovaks were exempted), but since then has been sifting the wheat from the chaff and has released thousands of anti-Nazi refugees. While the internment involved various privations, they were apparently unavoidable. The French government has evacuated the frontier population in Alsace-Lorraine, and these people, housed in camps like those of the German aliens, are suffering similar inconvenience.

France, it must be remembered, is a country of universal conscription. When war comes, there is a sudden disappearance of able-bodied men from the streets. Had the refugees been allowed to remain at large, sitting conspicuously in cafes and taking the jobs of the Frenchmen who went off to the front, there would have been a serious reaction among the French citizenry. The government was in a sense protecting the refugees by internment them.

Furthermore, France, unlike England, adjoins the enemy country, and consequently is obliged to take more severe precautions against espionage. Even

refugee relief organizations admitted that there were some among the refugees who might be "unreliable"—perhaps German agents posing as refugees—and these organizations would not take the responsibility of asking for mass release.

Since the mass internment, there has been an individual examination of German aliens and those found to be not sympathetic with Germany have been released. According to a Paris dispatch of December 16 to the *New York Times*, about 10,500 aliens of the 15,000 rounded up at the beginning of the war are still in camps. Other dispatches have quoted Minister of Interior Albert Sarraut as reporting to Parliament on December 12 that about 7,000 aliens had been released and as promising to pursue a liberal policy in regard to the remaining refugees.

The Jewish Telegraphic Agency reported on December 15 that two groups of refugees with visas for Palestine and the United States were released en masse on the condition that they emigrate immediately. And on January 22 the same agency published a list of 156 of the most prominent refugees who had been unconditionally released from the camps.

Men of military age were from the outset given an opportunity to enlist in the Foreign Legion. However, no duress has been used against aliens to compel their enlistment, and no punitive measures have been taken for refusal to enlist. The alien is given the alternative of being immediately released by enlistment in the legion or awaiting his hearing in due course. There is a humanitarian reason for designating the Foreign Legion instead of the regular army. German soldiers in the French army on the western front would be exposed to inhuman cruelty and certain death if captured.

Conditions within the internment camps have improved, according to a Paris dispatch to the *New York Times*, which states: "At the beginning of the war there were undoubtedly hardships for interned enemy aliens, since arrangements were largely makeshift, but conditions have improved vastly in all camps, the informant states, and today every refugee may be said to be satisfactorily lodged under fair hygienic conditions."

MAX WINKLER

New York, February 8

## The New Copyright Bill

*Dear Sirs:* A new proposal for a thorough amendment of the copyright legislation of the United States was presented to Congress on January 8, Senate Bill No. 3043. It should be given very careful study before enactment.

One drastic change proposed with respect to obligatory American manufacture should be eliminated. This major blot on our copyright legislation has existed since July 1, 1891; but since the Act of March 4, 1909, it has been confined to "Books and Periodicals" and, so far as foreign authors are concerned, to such of their books as are printed in the English language. From 1891 to the present time no British author has been able to secure full legal protection for his book, written and printed in his own language, until an American reprint of it has been published "printed from type set within the limits of the United States."

In this bill there has been substituted for existing law the following sweeping declaration: "All copies of any copyrighted work which shall be distributed in the United States in book, pamphlet, map, or sheet form, including illustrations, shall be printed from type set within the limits of the United States or its dependencies. . . ."

To ameliorate the hardship of immediate reprinting of the English author's book, under existing law, registration for it for an ad interim copyright of four months' duration may be made, and this period can be extended to twenty-eight years by the production of the British author's book manufactured in the United States. If no American reprint is so produced the copyright protection terminates at the end of four months.

In the bill this ad interim copyright is eliminated, and there is substituted permitted importation of the first 500 copies of the British author's own edition of his book. If copies beyond that number are imported, however, "then no remedies shall be available under this act for the printing, reprinting, publication, distribution, or vending of copies of such works made by any process set forth in Subsection 1 of Section 29." That is to say, the author loses his right to sue in case of American infringement of the copyright of his book.

The proponents of the bill in a note explain that "the sanction of the obligation not to import more than 500 copies of a foreign author's work is not the loss of the copyright in general." The author "merely has no remedy against

the printing, publication, or sale of a domestically manufactured work, but he maintains all other rights, for instance, for other versions of his work, for radio communications, for performance."

Two copies of the British author's book must be deposited in the Library of Congress within ninety days after publication, together with an affidavit declaring "that all copies of the deposited work have been of American manufacture." In the event of failure, the Register of Copyrights is authorized within two years after first publication to make a written demand for such copies, and within ninety days after its receipt, the publisher must either comply therewith, or "file with the Register of Copyrights in lieu thereof a written relinquishment and dedication of the publication rights." In the event of non-compliance, he "shall be subject to a penalty of \$100 to be paid to the Register of Copyrights."

It is believed that this novel procedure will be held contrary to the provisions of the Berne International Copyright Convention, Article 4 of which provides that the authors of any country of the Copyright Union shall have in the other union countries such rights as the respective laws "now accord or shall hereafter accord to nationals" and that "the enjoyment and the exercise of such rights are not subject to any formality."

This new proposal should be struck out together with the required obligatory American manufacture of "all copies of any copyright work in book, pamphlet, map, or sheet form," and there should be eliminated from the present copyright law Sections 21 and 22, providing for ad interim copyright.

These antiquated and illiberal provisions have nothing to do with the principles of copyright. What is demanded in the way of copyright legislation at this juncture is a bill based solely upon the acknowledged principles of literary property.

THORVALD SOLBERG

Washington, D. C., February 6

## "The Nation's" Sour Grapes

*Dear Sirs:* To this unwavering subscriber it beats all how *The Nation* does carry on at times. I am thinking now of the piece by Michel Mok in the issue of February 3. All these years haven't I heard *The Nation* screaming itself blue in the face because Hollywood was not dealing honestly with contemporary social themes? Now comes "The Grapes of Wrath," which Franz Hoellering calls "Hollywood's most distinguished

offering," and *The Nation*, through Mr. Mok, sticks out its tongue at Darryl Zanuck *et al.*

"The Grapes of Wrath" is bringing the migratory workers' plight to the attention of a vaster audience—including those at the preview—than John Steinbeck himself could reach through his book. That's something to cheer, not to sneer about.

KENNETH CLARK

New York, February 14

[If Michel Mok did any "sneering," it wasn't at Mr. Zanuck's excellent picture but at the preview audience, weighted with those elements that were responsible in part for the Okies' plight. Just irony, that's all.—EDITORS THE NATION.]

## Professor Taylor

*Dear Sirs:* Paul S. Taylor, coauthor of "An American Exodus," reviewed by Margaret Marshall in *The Nation* of January 20, is professor of economics at the University of California—not at Stanford University.

LUCY WARD STEBBINS

Berkeley, Cal., February 15

## More Birthday Greetings

*Dear Sirs:* I am very sorry that I have not been able to send you a more handsome present on the seventy-fifth birthday of *The Nation*. I can only offer you my heartiest congratulations and best wishes for many, many happy returns of your weekly, which has been not only my best friend for the last thirty years but also a best friend of my country and my people throughout its long life.

HU SHIH, Chinese Ambassador  
Washington

*Dear Sirs:* An attentive reader of *The Nation* for many years I have mostly admired its effort to extol national values without becoming nationalistic. Some people might call such effort an un-American activity, but in my view it is the only true Americanism. *The Nation* has always had a very definite meaning, but the term "nation" is unfortunately vague and ambiguous.

What is a nation? Is it a unity of economic interests, of race, of language, of history? It would be easy to quote examples disproving all these assumptions. Most likely it is a spiritual community, recognizable, according to Max Scheler, in its creations of art and in its leading personalities. However, the American national idea includes a diversity of ideals in art and very dif-

ferent personalities, representative of New England, the Middle West, California, and the South. This is why the American national idea, in spite of the fire that heated the traditional melting-pot and in spite of nationalistic hot-spurs, was and is international, just as the British Empire is an international community in spite of its Horatio Bottomleys, Sir Oswald Mosleys, and Colonel Blimps.

Those who are anxious to harden the pliable and ever growing national idea into a nationalistic idol should glance at the other hemisphere, where "patriotic snobbery," as Carlton Hayes termed it, is at work to destroy nations whose greatness chauvinism has boasted of creating. "Keep out of foreign entanglements" is an excellent catchword, but it should be realized that unfortunate Europe was caught in such entanglements by misinterpretation of the national idea. It seems to be a tragedy of mankind that the most sublime ideas underlying the state—such as religion in the past, nationality at present—are fated to become disastrous to the state they have created. Every sincere admirer of this country must hope that neither *The Nation* nor this nation will forsake its past in the future.

New York

RUSTEM VAMBERY

*Dear Sirs:* On its seventy-fifth birthday *The Nation* is to be congratulated on the theme which it has chosen for its anniversary issue—that of "taking stock of our period and its own record as well as looking ahead into the stormy future." This is a reflection of the breadth of editorial objective that has always characterized the publication.

In spite of its comparatively small circulation *The Nation* has been a potent force in the formation of public opinion in the United States. It gained this influence because it was read by editors and writers and the articulate opinion-forming people in America, also because the intellectually curious and experimental young people of the country were attracted by its provocative content. In literary and dramatic criticism it has had reality and authority. Whether one agreed with *The Nation's* analyses and conclusions has been beside the point. Its service in clarifying minds through stimulating comment on the current scene is what has counted.

New York

HELEN ROGERS REID

*Dear Sirs:* At the *Time and Tide* offices we have taken *The Nation*, I believe, ever since we came into existence, and

almost every Wednesday—our press day—I take it out to read over a late lunch. Not quite every Wednesday, because, especially since the war started, Atlantic posts are a little uncertain.

Before the war I used to take it out along with a big bundle of other overseas papers and pick from each what seemed of special interest that week. Now I find that on Wednesdays it is enough by itself, for I want to read it pretty well straight through. Our own papers are so full of war news that we don't get so much American news as we used to, and one is greedy both for American home news and for American reactions to the war. Incidentally *The Nation* has had almost the best set of correspondents on the war that I have seen anywhere—as, for example, Louis Fischer from Paris and Rome, and Oswald Garrison Villard from Berlin and Amsterdam. The London *Daily Telegraph* printed a series of Oswald Garrison Villard's articles, but I do not think that anyone over here has had Louis Fischer, and he is one of the best correspondents writing today.

I disagree with *The Nation* quite often. I sometimes think it unfair to Britain and to the British government. I don't hold any special brief for the Chamberlain government. It has made some very bad mistakes. But it has had uncommonly difficult problems to tackle. I am not sure that *The Nation* three thousand miles away from Europe always appreciates fully just how difficult those problems were—and are. No, I don't always agree with it—but I couldn't do without it.

London

LADY RHONDDA

*Dear Sirs:* I think I am the oldest subscriber to *The Nation*. I did not read the first issue, but I have read every issue since the first one I read. That was about fifty years ago. At my age and in this era of disillusionment I still preserve some enthusiasms. I value *The Nation* for more reasons than I can take your space to enumerate, but chiefly for its fearlessness, for its sturdy espousal of the forlorn and oppressed, who have few to take up the cudgels for them, and for its ready acknowledgment of the few mistakes it makes. I love it for the enemies it has made.

Some years ago I took myself severely in hand when I found myself suspending judgment until I could see what *The Nation* said. I thought that an unhealthy attitude intellectually. It no longer worries me, for I know I shall agree.

Dover, N. H.

JANE S. BRYAN

*Dear Sirs:* I congratulate *The Nation* on attaining its seventy-fifth birthday. It is one of the few publications that I read from cover to cover. I always find it stimulating, even when I do not agree with its conclusions.

When I was in my district this summer I was told by one of my friends—a leading member of the bar in the Pacific Northwest and an exceptionally scholarly gentleman—that he read and enjoyed *The Nation*. Although he is conservative in his opinions, he said that he always found it an intellectual treat.

I wish you another seventy-five years of useful service to the American people.

MARTIN F. SMITH, Representative  
Hoquiam, Wash.

## CONTRIBUTORS

KENNETH CRAWFORD, who writes regularly from Washington for *The Nation*, was recently elected president of the American Newspaper Guild.

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## INFORMATION FOR SUBSCRIBERS

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